
57 segments available
In this episode, Prof Paine looks at Maoist China. How did Mao go from military genius to peacetime disaster? How did the patriotic hero inflict history’s worst catastrophe on China? How can someone shrewd enough to win a civil war outnumbered 5 to 1 make decisions like "let's have peasants make iron in their backyards" and "let's kill all the birds"? Lecture is followed by a Q&A with me. The first nationwide famine in Chinese history; Mao's lasting influence on other insurgencies; broken promises to Chinese minorities and the peasantry; what Taiwan means. Huge thanks to Substack for hosting this! 𝐄𝐏𝐈𝐒𝐎𝐃𝐄 𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐊𝐒 * Transcript: https://www.dwarkesh.com/sarah-paine-china * Spotify: http://spoti.fi/3APeQ3L * Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/dwarkesh-podcast/id1516093381 𝐒𝐏𝐎𝐍𝐒𝐎𝐑𝐒 * Today’s episode is brought to you by Scale AI. Scale partners with the U.S. government to fuel America’s AI advantage through their data foundry. Scale recently introduced Defense Llama, Scale's latest solution available for military personnel. With Defense Llama, military personnel can harness the power of AI to plan military or intelligence operations and understand adversary vulnerabilities. If you’re interested in learning more on how Scale powers frontier AI capabilities, go to https://scale.com/dwarkesh. To sponsor a future episode, visit https://www.dwarkesh.com/p/advertise 𝐒𝐀𝐑𝐀𝐇'𝐒 𝐁𝐎𝐎𝐊𝐒 * "The Wars for Asia, 1911–1949" https://www.amazon.com/Wars-Asia-1911-1949-S-Paine-ebook/dp/B0096R1NZ4 * "The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War" https://www.amazon.com/Japanese-Empire-Strategy-Restoration-Pacific/dp/1107676169 𝐓𝐈𝐌𝐄𝐒𝐓𝐀𝐌𝐏𝐒 00:00:00 - Intro 00:00:47 - Disclaimer 00:03:13 - Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Thayer Mahan, Corbett 00:09:31 - The 1911 Revolution and the Civil War 00:14:27 - Clausewitz on Mao 00:15:47 - Mao the propagandist 00:24:35 - Mao the social scientist 00:29:51 - Mao the military leader 00:40:17 - Mao the feminist 00:49:34 - Mao the grand strategist 00:58:12 - Yin and Yang analysis 01:02:14 - Q&A begins 01:05:16 - Why was Mao worse than Stalin? 01:11:42 - Yalta satisfied no-one 01:14:50 - Corrupt allies, ideologue enemies 01:16:29 - US indifference to the Nationalists 01:25:35 - Imagining a Nationalist mainland 01:28:21 - Communists cling to power 01:32:02 - Xi and Mao 01:38:13 - Making victims victimize themselves 01:42:15 - Journalists' naivete 01:46:16 - Visiting China then and now
Professor Sarah Paine introduces Mao Zedong as a pivotal figure in 20th-century history, emphasizing his dual role as a military genius and a controversial leader. She discusses Mao's significant impact on China and the world, highlighting his theories that have influenced various insurgencies. This segment sets the stage for understanding Mao's complex legacy, including his military strategies and the catastrophic consequences of his policies.
"What I'm about to say are my ideas, they don't necessarily represent those of the US government, the US Navy Department, the US Department of Defense, or the Naval War College, you got that clea..."
In this segment, Professor Paine outlines the historical context of Mao's rise to power, detailing the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the ensuing civil war. She explains how Mao's military strategies and social revolutions reshaped China, leading to significant civilian casualties during his rule. This analysis provides insight into Mao's transition from a revolutionary leader to a figure responsible for immense suffering.
"And oh, by the way, a lot of those 8,000, 7,000 pages weren't that interesting, so in a way, you owe me. All right, these are major military theorists, just to run you through them. Clausewitz i..."
Professor Paine discusses the Great Famine in China, attributing it to Mao's policies during the Great Leap Forward. She highlights the devastating impact of collectivization and food exportation, which led to the deaths of approximately 40 million people. This segment emphasizes the tragic consequences of Mao's economic decisions and the human cost of his leadership.
"than a political revolution. You're not just replacing the government; you're going to wipe out entire social classes. And I don't mean then, "Hey, here's your one-way ticket out of here" kind o..."
In this segment, Professor Paine contrasts Mao's military successes with his failures in economic governance. She reflects on how Mao's ability to unify China under communism is overshadowed by his inability to manage the economy, leading to widespread famine and suffering. This duality in Mao's legacy raises questions about how he is perceived in China today.
"to understand Mao's theories, I need to put it in the context of the wars that he fought. So in 1911, Qing Dynasty collapses. The country shatters into a multilateral warfare among warlords, thes..."
Professor Paine introduces a framework for analyzing Mao's leadership qualities, referencing Clausewitz's definitions of great leadership. She outlines Mao's intellect and determination, setting the stage for a deeper exploration of his roles as a propagandist, social scientist, military leader, and grand strategist. This segment provides a structured approach to understanding Mao's complex character.
"Long march is a real misnomer. It's the Long Rout. The Communists lose 95% of their forces. I believe in English “decimate” means to lose 10%. Losing 95%, I think you need a whole new verb for wh..."
In this segment, Professor Paine delves into Mao's early career as a propagandist, highlighting his strategic use of propaganda to gain power. She discusses his belief in the importance of combining propaganda with military action, illustrating how he effectively communicated his messages to the Chinese populace. This analysis reveals the foundational role of propaganda in Mao's rise to prominence.
"Now, I promised you a simple framework. Here's the simple framework. Simple framework should have three to five things because that's all about any of us could really handle on short notice. And..."
Professor Paine explores the strategic communication methods employed by Mao and the Communist Party. She discusses the roles of messengers, messages, and mediums in disseminating propaganda, emphasizing the importance of local grievances and mobilization. This segment highlights how Mao's communication strategies were integral to his political success and the establishment of the Communist regime.
"All right. Mao began his public service career as a propagandist. And if you look at his early biography, he's born in 1893 to a prosperous but not particularly well-educated father who tilled h..."
In this segment, Professor Paine discusses Mao's focus on education as a tool for political mobilization. She explains how Mao's initiatives aimed to educate the illiterate population, thereby fostering loyalty and support for the Communist Party. This analysis underscores the significance of education in Mao's strategy to consolidate power and transform Chinese society.
"to reach a population and mobilize it. Military messengers are a little different. Every single military unit had about a 20-member propaganda team. That's a lot of people. According to Mao, the ..."
Prof. Paine delves into Mao's analytical approach to the peasant problem, emphasizing that he viewed the support of peasants as crucial for the success of the national revolution. She explains how Mao conducted extensive surveys to understand land ownership and class dynamics, ultimately advocating for a revolution to empower the impoverished majority against the landlord class.
"an institutional medium of education. And here is Mao, the primary school teacher, in his element. Most of the people in his armies were illiterate, but Mao knew all about how to reach them. There ..."
This segment explores Mao's strategy for land reform, which he believed was essential for gaining peasant allegiance. Prof. Paine outlines Mao's bureaucratic approach to redistributing land, the violent implications of his policies, and how he aimed to mobilize the lower classes to overthrow the upper classes, all while maintaining a facade of support for middle peasants.
"Counter-Japan Red Army University, of the first original departments, political work is one of them. This is not professional military education the way it's done in the West, it's a separate th..."
Prof. Paine discusses the darker aspects of Mao's land reform policies, including the use of coercion and violence against landlords. She highlights Mao's ruthless tactics to ensure compliance and the complexities of his promises to peasants, which often involved a bait-and-switch strategy that ultimately led to the collectivization of land.
"And he goes further into the statistics and he identifies 70% as poor peasants, 20% who are like his father—they till their own land, they're middle peasants—and then there are the exploitative ..."
In this segment, Prof. Paine examines Mao's military strategies and his belief that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' She discusses Mao's unique approach to warfare, his conflicts with Communist Central, and how his unconventional tactics ultimately led to significant victories during the Chinese Civil War.
"That's what the Communists are going to do. But he says, "Look, the system of landlords and tenants cannot be completely destroyed yet." Because he needs the peasants to join him, and the peasant..."
Prof. Paine recounts the challenges faced during the Long March, highlighting Mao's strategic decisions that ultimately proved successful. She contrasts Mao's vision with that of his critics, illustrating how his determination and unconventional tactics allowed him to emerge as a key leader in the Communist movement.
"we're going to do Mao the military leader. You've probably heard this chestnut from Mao: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Mao spent his- it’s still part of his early career- be..."
This segment focuses on Mao's interpretation of war and revolution, emphasizing his belief that warfare is a means to achieve political ends. Prof. Paine discusses Mao's view on class struggle and the necessity of violence in overthrowing the landlord class, setting the stage for his revolutionary ideology.
"it, that Mao may have known what he was doing. Then, on the Long Retreat, Mao chose as his terminal point of retreat, like where you’re going to wind up, as up in Yenon, way up north, deep in Mus..."
Prof. Paine explains Mao's strategic thinking regarding the establishment of base areas for guerrilla warfare. She outlines the prerequisites for successful military operations and how Mao's understanding of terrain and local support shaped his military strategies during the civil war.
"and that the ones that were ongoing were the civil war with the Nationalists and then the regional war with Japan. Pearl Harbor comes a little later. And he talked about defeating Japan in three..."
In this segment, Prof. Paine contrasts Mao's guerrilla warfare tactics with conventional military strategies. She discusses the importance of guerrilla forces in undermining enemy strength and how Mao's innovative approach to military organization contributed to the Communist victory.
"He also said that if you're weak the way the Communists were, you had to follow a strategy of annihilation. What you do is you annihilate one small enemy unit at a time, and the cumulative effec..."
Prof. Paine highlights Mao's progressive views on women's rights and minority self-determination during the revolutionary period. She discusses how Mao's policies aimed to empower women and minorities, recognizing their crucial roles in the success of the Communist movement, while also noting the eventual betrayal of these promises.
"the Long March was up in Yenan. He thought it was important to figure those things out in advance. Mao also cultivated an unprecedented group of allies, never before assembled in Chinese history: ..."
This segment covers Mao's strategy for undermining the enemy army from within. Prof. Paine explains how Mao's tactics involved infiltrating enemy ranks with loyalists and using leniency to create divisions, ultimately weakening the Nationalist forces during the civil war.
"he had a strategy of disintegrating the enemy army and let me tell you how that one worked. In every county, you select a large number of workers and peasant comrades, people below the radar, and..."
Prof. Paine concludes this segment by analyzing Mao's strategic assessment of Japan during the regional war. She discusses how Mao recognized Japan's weaknesses and the implications for his military strategy, setting the stage for the Communist response to Japanese aggression.
"This meant that guerrillas could roam far and wide behind Japanese lines. Also, the Japanese were brutal, just gratuitously brutal, and they're outsiders. This means that the peasantry are natur..."
Prof. Paine introduces Mao's paradigm of the three stages of people's war, detailing the strategic defensive, the strategic offensive, and the importance of popular mobilization. She explains how these stages build upon each other and the critical mass needed to transition from one phase to the next.
"theory is his three stages of people's war. The first stage is the strategic defensive. It's the "prevent defeat" phase. The last phase, phase three, is the strategic offensive, the "delivery vi..."
In this segment, Prof. Paine discusses the dangers Mao faced during the transition from phase one to phase two of his strategy. She highlights the need for caution against the nationalists' counter-strategies and the importance of timing and resource management in the civil war context.
"is basically you have a critical mass of base areas, cadres, armed forces that you can move into phase two. But the problem of being in phase two is what had looked like isolated acts of banditr..."
Prof. Paine clarifies Mao's limited direct involvement in the war against Japan, contrasting it with the Nationalists' efforts. She discusses how Mao used the situation to strengthen the Communist Party's position during the civil war, despite the Nationalists bearing the brunt of the fighting.
"role the world over. And so this is the secret sauce of people's war: if you want to get to phase three, you need a big buddy. That's where the Soviet Union came in. And so this is why Mao determ..."
This segment focuses on Mao's ability to integrate various elements of national power into a coherent strategy. Prof. Paine outlines Mao's instruments of power, including peasantry, propaganda, and diplomacy, and compares them to modern military frameworks.
"talking about really applies to the civil war. And Mao understands these different layers. So, as the Nationalists are busy fighting the Japanese and actually being destroyed by them, the communi..."
Prof. Paine discusses Mao's adaptation of Marxism to fit the Chinese context, positioning himself as a leader of communism after Stalin's death. She emphasizes Mao's foresight regarding the role of the peasantry and women in revolution, showcasing his strategic thinking.
"land reform, base areas, institution building, warfare, and diplomacy. The US military, when they're thinking about elements of national power, love this little framework: DIME. D is for diplomac..."
In this segment, Prof. Paine outlines key concepts from Mao's strategies that are applicable to modern insurgencies. She compares Mao's rural mobilization efforts with those in Vietnam and Korea, highlighting the importance of base areas and local support.
"who dies in 1953, as the leader of communism. Mao was prescient on numerous levels. He was certainly prescient about the centrality of the peasantry. He was way ahead of his times on the importan..."
Prof. Paine elaborates on the significance of base areas in Mao's strategy and their successful application in North Vietnam. She contrasts this with the challenges faced by North Korea, emphasizing the geographical and political factors that influence insurgency success.
"take over the host from within. I've listed a variety of them here, and I'm going to go through them in turn. These are the things that the counterinsurgent then has to counter. All right, rural ..."
This segment discusses Mao's tactic of luring enemies into vulnerable positions, using historical examples from the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War. Prof. Paine explains how this strategy can inform modern military considerations.
"thinking about ISIS or whatever's left of it, you can go back to Mao's ideas about base areas, that you need a particular kind of geography that's good for the defensive. You've got to have a bi..."
Prof. Paine analyzes the phenomenon of enemy disintegration in prolonged conflicts, drawing parallels between historical examples like the Nationalists and Japanese. She discusses the psychological and material factors that contribute to this outcome.
"and that worked. Then when the Manchurian campaign initially wasn't going well for Mao, he retreated up to Siping, which is a little bit north, and that worked well enough. But when Chiang Kai-s..."
In this segment, Prof. Paine revisits Mao's three stages of people's war, discussing their cumulative nature and how they can serve as a metric for assessing insurgency progress. She reflects on the applicability of these stages to contemporary conflicts.
"Of course, Mao's big contribution was his three stages of people's war. Mao presents them as sequential: you go from one to two to three, and tada, you win. And they're cumulative, right? You do ..."
Prof. Paine explores the dualities present in Mao's strategic thought, linking them to traditional Chinese philosophy. She discusses how these dualities inform his military strategies and the complexities of decision-making in warfare.
"recommend it—one is struck by all these dualities. I think it goes back to Yin and Yang analysis, which is very prominent in traditional Chinese thinking. So, if you look at Mao discussing trian..."
In this concluding segment, Prof. Paine contrasts Mao's early military acumen with his later economic failures during the Great Leap Forward. She examines the disconnect between his revolutionary ideals and the practical challenges of governing a vast nation.
"they're graduated, and evolution is much more conducive to economic development than revolution. So here's something I'm confused by. You were talking about Mao as a shrewd commander, somebody who..."
This segment features a comparison between Mao and Stalin, focusing on their leadership styles and the consequences of their policies. Prof. Paine discusses the intentionality behind Stalin's famines versus Mao's misguided attempts at rapid industrialization, highlighting the differences in their approaches to governance and ideology.
"those factors. It's so big when you start putting a policy in place from Beijing. And then how that actually fans out over the whole country, it's got to be a mess. Different localities and things..."
Prof. Paine reflects on the historical context of China's civil wars, discussing the devastation caused by various rebellions and the impact on Mao's ability to govern. She draws parallels to the American Civil War, emphasizing the unique challenges China faced in the aftermath of such widespread conflict.
"disposal than what the Chinese communists are going to have. Also, the kind of warfare. Think about the warfare in China. You got the Taiping Rebellion, only the biggest of the peasant rebellion..."
In this segment, Prof. Paine analyzes Mao's strategic miscalculations during the Great Leap Forward, contrasting his wartime acumen with his peacetime failures. She discusses the lack of situational awareness that led to disastrous decisions, illustrating the complexities of leadership in a rapidly changing political landscape.
"Mao can't surf that wave, no one can. Just to linger on this... Uh-oh. New exit strategy. Even if he's not a specialist on agriculture, and even if China is a hard country to govern, he was somebo..."
Prof. Paine discusses the geopolitical landscape following World War II, examining how the outcomes of the war influenced the rise of communism in China. She reflects on the failures of American foreign policy and the implications of supporting corrupt regimes in the face of ideological extremism.
"It's a real case against dictatorship. For all the chaos of party politics, you're at least forced to confront the counterargument. It is a healthier situation to be in. Let's go back to the end ..."
In this segment, Prof. Paine emphasizes the importance of understanding historical context in shaping foreign policy. She critiques the U.S. response to the Chinese Civil War and the implications of overextension, advocating for a more nuanced approach to international relations.
"reason you all are prosperous is there's a global maritime order in which people obey rules because it is so much cheaper to obey rules. Because what do you do when people break the rules? You h..."
Prof. Paine discusses the significance of institutions in nation-building, contrasting the situations in Japan and Germany with that of China. She highlights the lack of indigenous expertise in China and the challenges faced in establishing effective governance post-World War II.
"There are 300 million Americans, while the world's got 8 billion. Uh, be cautious. What's key on this maritime order, the big insurance policy of it all, is our allies and institutions. This is ..."
This segment explores the consequences of American support, or lack thereof, for Chiang Kai-shek during the Chinese Civil War. Prof. Paine argues that the U.S. underestimated the complexities of the conflict and the implications of their foreign policy decisions.
"parliaments and other things. So that when you give Germans some cash, and Japanese as well, they know exactly how to recreate things and rapidly produce modern institutions. You're talking abou..."
Prof. Paine critiques the missteps of American diplomacy in post-war China, discussing the failure to adequately support the Nationalists and the consequences of a misguided approach to foreign aid. She emphasizes the need for a realistic assessment of geopolitical dynamics.
"and who knows how they raised their families? I thought it was the case that George Marshall, who was the envoy to China, the diplomat. I thought it was a case that later on they realized it was ..."
In this concluding segment, Prof. Paine reflects on the importance of understanding the motivations of warring parties in conflict. She discusses the futility of attempting to broker peace between irreconcilable factions, drawing lessons from the Chinese Civil War for contemporary foreign policy.
"of the Marshall Plan to keep China from turning Communist. And look what the consequences were: Vietnam, we had to fight, Korea, we had to fight, Cambodia, the genocide there. But you can't solve..."
In this segment, Prof. Paine highlights the difficulties of forming coalition governments in the context of the Chinese Civil War. She draws parallels with other global conflicts, emphasizing that when adversaries are deeply entrenched, attempts at cooperation are futile. The discussion reflects on the U.S. isolationist stance and its impact on foreign policy decisions during and after World War II.
"the mistake- and this is a common one that Americans make so this is worth talking about- is Americans often don't look at warring parties to understand if they are primary adversaries there is ..."
Prof. Paine examines the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War and the Nationalists' retreat to Taiwan. She discusses how the Nationalists conducted an after-action analysis that led to significant reforms, including land redistribution, which contributed to Taiwan's economic success. The segment contrasts Taiwan's development with the mainland's struggles under Communist rule.
"country and didn't have the attitude of a great power until after World War II. In World War I, we felt dragged into it, and these horrible wars, and being quite irresponsible during the Great D..."
This segment delves into the catastrophic consequences of Mao's policies, particularly the Great Leap Forward, which led to widespread famine and millions of deaths. Prof. Paine discusses the differences in how the Communists and Nationalists managed their resources and the implications of these strategies on their respective support from the populace.
"Taiwanese were given bonds, and they thought those bonds would be like the pieces of paper that were issued in the mainland, i.e worth nothing, but actually after time they became quite valuable. ..."
Prof. Paine analyzes the Communist Party's effective governance strategies that allowed Mao to maintain power despite the chaos and suffering caused by his policies. She discusses the role of the party system and the commissar structure in consolidating control, contrasting it with the failures of other regimes to maintain stability post-conflict.
"there in the incredibly baggy clothing. No one's got luxury wear or anything. Although after they won, Mao is famously a fan of luxury and has -- right? In a way that I think Stalin would sleep o..."
In this segment, Prof. Paine explains how Mao's Cultural Revolution served as a mechanism for him to regain power after being sidelined by party officials. She discusses the mobilization of youth and the chaos that ensued, highlighting the devastating effects on China's educational system and societal structure.
"but it does not deliver prosperity, it delivers compounding poverty, take a look at North Korea. It's a mess, but the man's in power. Why don't the high-level officials in the CCP, after they see..."
Prof. Paine reflects on Mao's enduring legacy in China and how Xi Jinping's leadership draws inspiration from Maoist principles. She discusses the complexities of Mao's image in contemporary China and the paradox of his reverence despite the atrocities committed during his rule.
"And it is ruinous for production, right? Doing all this. And you're gutting your educational system. All the people who gave the hard grades, who may have actually known something, they're gone. ..."
This segment explores the psychological and cultural factors that shape the Chinese public's perception of Mao. Prof. Paine discusses the pride in Chinese civilization and the difficulty of confronting historical atrocities, drawing parallels with American attitudes towards its own past.
"So he's a believer in communism. Don't ever kid yourself that the Communist Party of China doesn't believe in communism now. They think they've modified some of the economic stuff under Deng Xia..."
Prof. Paine speculates on how Mao's disastrous policies may have inadvertently paved the way for China's post-Mao economic reforms. She highlights Taiwan's successful transformation as a counterexample to the failures of the mainland, emphasizing the importance of learning from history.
"I'm guessing, I'm not Chinese, but I think all of us need to be proud of things. Of course, one thing to be very proud of if you're Chinese is Chinese civilization. These enormous achievements i..."
In this segment, Prof. Paine discusses the distinct characteristics of Chinese communism, particularly the emphasis on re-education rather than outright extermination of perceived enemies. She contrasts this with other totalitarian regimes, providing insight into the cultural and historical context that shapes China's approach to governance.
"ever go to a Chinese movie you hear the erhu, whatever the instrument is, it's just so sad and melancholy. Whereas American movies are all happy. Millions of people die, but the good guys live, ..."
Prof. Paine analyzes Chiang Kai-shek's perspective on communism and his strategic decisions during the Chinese Civil War. She discusses his initial interest in communist ideology and how his experiences led him to recognize the threat posed by the Communists, ultimately shaping his military strategies.
"has that can't—that no one can duplicate—except for crazy stuff. What I find disturbing about communism in comparison to—I mean, maybe even especially Chinese communism— is... when Hitler is kill..."
This segment examines the role of Western journalists, particularly Edgar Snow, in shaping perceptions of Mao and the Communist Party. Prof. Paine discusses the psychological factors that contributed to their sympathetic portrayals and the consequences of their naivety in understanding the complexities of the Chinese political landscape.
"was the nature of his anti-communism? Because in retrospect, obviously the means we don't endorse, but he was right about that understanding of what would happen with the Communists in power. He ..."
This segment explores the role of Edgar Snow, an American journalist, in shaping Western perceptions of Mao and the Chinese Communist Party. Prof. Paine details Snow's journey to interview Mao, his idealistic views, and how his writings contributed to a skewed understanding of the Communist regime.
"When you read Western journalists who are covering the communists in China sympathetically, people like Edgar Snow, and this is not just true of China, Walter Duranty covering up the Holodomor i..."
Prof. Paine analyzes the evolution of Edgar Snow's book 'Red Star Over China,' revealing how Mao influenced its content. The segment discusses the removal of critical references and images, showcasing the power of narrative control in shaping historical memory and public perception.
"So what was it? Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of China, is married to one of the Soong sisters. Another one of the Soong sisters is married to Chiang Kai-shek. And there's a third one who's ..."
In this segment, Prof. Paine reflects on Edgar Snow's legacy and his refusal to acknowledge the atrocities committed under Mao's regime. Despite the purges and famines, Snow's commitment to his narrative illustrates the dangers of unchecked idealism in journalism.
"original version has all kinds of pictures of people that Mao subsequently purges, so those pictures go away. All references to those people go away, and they're no longer in the index. And Edgar..."
Prof. Paine discusses the significance of strategic communication in politics, drawing parallels between Mao's slogans and modern disinformation. This segment emphasizes the enduring impact of rhetoric in shaping public opinion and political landscapes.
"When you had the slogans up about what Mao is telling the peasants or the different slogans he would come up with, it's not tremendously sophisticated stuff. It's like one line that's catchy or ..."
This segment covers the challenges faced by historians in accessing archives in China and Russia. Prof. Paine shares her experiences and the implications of restricted access on understanding historical events, particularly in the context of Mao's China.
"good at understanding both sides fighting, and then you feed information both ways so that they're just at each other's throats, and being more and more dysfunctional. Oh, yeah. When was the last..."
Prof. Paine reflects on the tragic human capacity for both creativity and destruction. This segment discusses the historical context of violence and warfare, emphasizing that the capacity for atrocity is not unique to any one culture or nation.
"Yeah. When you're in these archives and you're studying all these atrocities that happen, if you look at the numbers themselves, it might be fair to call it genuinely the worst thing that ever h..."