hello everyone and welcome back to conversations with Tyler today I'm very happy to be chatting with valina chakarova who is a geopolitical strategist with long-standing experience she is founder of her group Face which stands for for a conscious experience I first learned of Alina by reading her on Twitter velina welcome thank you thank you very much
for being with you and I look forward to a highly interesting conversation now you're from Bulgaria so I've long wondered the first and second Balan Wars that preceded World War I do they still matter today or what did we learn from them well of course they matter in a sense because you are probably familiar with the term balkanization and
unfortunately the term balkanization that means splitting a country into smaller parts in order for external powers to interfere uh to play you know different uh political actors off against each other and that kind of things is still very much relevant and it's being used and applied to other regions to other parts of the world it
matters also in terms of sentiments and in terms of uh you know if you like moods um if you take a look at the political landscape in most of uh the let's say Balkan countries we still call our region the balcan region even though that uh Outsiders describe it at Southeast Europe mostly um you will find all of these sentiments being kind of
you know reflected in various political groups and parties we have nationalists in most of these countries uh which are getting stronger by the day and are running for you know for for elections and are using actually a agenda and narratives that have been known for the last 200 years uh so all in all it's uh yeah unfortunately uh quite quite
relevant and even let me use another example uh the incident the helicopter Clash Crash from yesterday where uh president the Iranian president and the for the foreign minister um you know uh passed away was used as an ex example by some analysts already uh I would just uh use the reference here uh that it could be the next arable moment now again we
have you know balcon Wars and then we had Al also as you know the big uh you know moment the biggest Black Swan as being described by Professor Nasim talb the survival moment from 1914 that was an unanticipated event which eventually resulted in the first W you know you know War so even now this reference is being used as um you know survival
moment as something that is you know defined as a Black Swan event and that could uh you know lead to a major military conflict if not even let's say another world war so all in all these kind of things are still uh kind of uh relevant even though that they are not having the same of course uh influence or scale as it used to be the case uh
200 years ago now Bulgarian nationalism in the past as you know it's so often been about dreams of a greater Bulgaria and there are Bulgarian minorities in Albania different parts of the Balkans and this notion of creating something like a Bulgarian world or S Stefano Bulgaria with larger borders but with current demographic collapse in Bulgaria
migration to the EU other places low birth rates what is the future of Bulgarian nationalis does it does it have a future at all um I think that the second part of the question is easier to be answered yes nationalism as I already outlined is always G going to have uh some sort of uh Solid Ground in the whole region
including Bulgaria and again right now we have a very strong uh you know sentiment nationalistic sentiment that is also uh you know uh finding a political reflection um at and we have elections uh in June uh for Parliament since the coalition government between the conservatives and the Liberals has went you know parted ways uh but um
coming to you know the you know the first part of uh your question um these sentiments will be politicized and instrumentalized but they will not find a common denominator among the population in Bulgaria the dream of let's say s Stefano Bulgaria or if you like you know uh big Bulgaria including you know um parts of uh other countries uh neighbors is is
over this is not going to you know uh come back uh specifically in the case of Bulgaria I would argue actually in the case of the other neighbors as well unless we see a major uh you know uh process that right now I don't see happening in the short term um of let's say dissolvement of the European Union because so long as these countries are
part of the European Union or are candidates for the European Union this kind of uh conflicts will always uh find um you know a kind of solution mechanism within uh the institutions and there will be enough incentives for broader part of the parties um and um actors uh you know to find a common Den nominator so um yes even countries like uh North
Macedonia and we saw that there were immediately conflict uh a kind of a verbal conflict between North Macedonia and Greece because uh the newly elected president of North Macedonia didn't use the full name but used only the name of Macedonia these kind of sensitivities will remain but uh again they do not find a common denominator even in these
countries now going back to the demographics I think this is the bigger issue because right now and probably the most famous uh you know uh person right now who is uh making the case the strong case of um shrinking uh demographics all all over the world with a few exceptions of course because Africa and Southeast Asia will still see at macro level kind
of positive demographics but in general Bulgaria is probably one of the fastest shrink ing uh you know demographically shrinking countries in the world not just in Europe and here we have a very very you know serious issue that is a systematic and a structural issue that goes back to 30 years of uh political mismanagement corruption and U you know
precarious I would say socioeconomic indicator so it's not just about the missing birth rates is also about the skyrocketing uh you know debt rates in this country and um you you know more or less uh 3 million 3 and a half million people who have um uh sold their you know happiness and uh try to find their luck outside of the country which is
quite telling are the countries in the Balkans the right size are there too many of them so if we go back to the Balkan Wars well first Bulgaria and a number of other countries take from the Ottoman Empire then you turn around and basically a year later countries take from Bulgaria is there any stability in that region without an outside
hedgemon there is a stability outside uh the you know the influence exercise exercised by uh hedgman uh for instance to the balance of uh several external Powers this is the case right now so we do not have a honic power in the region right now we have let's say if you like a balance Act of several external and very powerful actors uh that's not just
uh you know the European Union with its je economic Cloud uh it's also Russia still very much active in the region and we have also turkey which is also of course quite active and we have the United States and China also trying to have uh you know to play their leverage in the region so you see that it's not one specific Hedon that's always always
been the case by the way if you would like to go back to the Balkan Wars if you would like to go back to previous periods of uh uh the Balan you know the re of the Balan region you would find out that uh once again it was a competition of several Empires and each of these Empires was trying to get a chunk of this region for itself um and
practically through this Balancing Act uh you know these small uh states were trying to you know capitalize um on their own interests and this is a Continuum a geopolitical Continuum that uh is still very much um you know uh in play in this region why do you think it is say that Bulgaria and Serbia remain closer to Russia even with Putin or if
you compare czechia and Slovakia Slovakia seems much closer to Russia or at least some parts of Slovakia than czechia does what what predicts which nations in Eastern Europe will have this attraction to the east first and foremost I would say it's cyclical it's not just you know you don't have a recipe that uh reflects uh
on the realities on the ground uh you know one onone you have a very strong cultural personal cultural and historical roots of course specifically in this region you have religious uh and uh also post Imperial Imperial po Imperial roots in in the case of the Russian Empire that has been you know I would argue that what we see right now
with Russia is uh you know a Continuum of uh uh the Russian Empire DNA and uh and practically uh I use this uh Golden Rule of the closer the better you know in terms of uh influence and in terms of penetration and subversion the closer to the core uh the bigger the influence we saw this clearly also during the Cold War with Bulgaria being
prob the most uh affected and uh you know highly uh influenced satellite with almost no saying in what whatever you know topics and uh at the same time if you look at uh the policies um and actions of uh uh Soviet block satellites such as Poland or uh Czechoslovakia at that time you will see that they had much more space to act and uh they were
more you know they were prone to more you know uh turmoil uh internal turmoil even Hungary if you if you uh consider they had you know their moments of uh turning against the Soviet Union no this hasn't been the case with uh with Bulgaria in the case of Serbia because again you cannot use a common denominator you cannot just say that these two because they were
geographically and still are geographically closer they would be you know more uh influenced by Russia because in the case of Serbia being you know know um still in a very very specific situation following the collapse of Yugoslavia trying to find um external partners that support you know the uh the leadership at the same time
facing new realities with uh uh the buildup of uh the other uh States uh Slovenia Croatia Bosnia Montenegro and so on and so forth of course Serbia was in a dire need to have a very strong uh uh supporter and it find it has found the supporter in the face of uh Russia in the Bulgarian case this is more historic it has a sentiment in the Bulgarian uh
population even uh up until today that has to do with the U you know with the um emancipation of the Bulgarian uh State the third Bulgarian State following you know uh the Russian Turkish war from uh 1878 and then practically because of the Russian Empire Bulgaria could regain its statehood and the first s of Bulgaria was also uh practically uh from from the
Russian Empire with Alexander battenberg so we had a very different you know mo of uh of um of let's say uh development and at the same time um influence you know um today we have for instance political parties in Bulgaria that are still very much let's say um rooted in the same mindset that uh one needs an internal friendship with
Russia that this is the only way forward even on behalf of the social social Democrats social Democrats you will find these kind of voices we have a Bulgarian president who is very much also Pro even though that he will deny it so you see that these kind of layers of U you know uh influence and penetration to some extent are very very you know are
manifold you will have uh some that are taking place on a on a free let's say free base out of uh political convention or out of individual you know uh conviction but you will have also some instrumentalized influences I wouldn't uh use any generalization for the region except as I said this gold golden rule that uh could be applicable that of
course um uh the geographic approximation uh is certainly an indicator that will tell you a lot about how an external and Powerful player would uh behave towards the smaller neighbors and will try to of course increase its leverage via via different uh mechanisms and uh actions and uh this goes through cultural ties through
personal business uh ties but also political uh and economic projects so it goes also via instrumentalization of dependencies raw materials and all of these kind of things let me give you another example uh just to end end up this topic if you go to Serbia nowadays and ask the you know just conduct a poll uh in the Serbian population and ask who
is you know the uh one of the biggest um investors in Serbia you know a lot of people will tell you that this is Russia which is actually not the case it's not factual uh because still the European Union is in fact the biggest institutional uh investor in the country but it tells you a lot about perception how Russia is being perceived in terms
of uh its uh strong cow in you know in the country maybe we'll come back to Bulgaria but let me try some questions about the broader World why is it you think China will not attack Taiwan they claim it as theirs and arguably in 5 to 10 years they'll be able to neutralize our submarine Advantage from the US with underwater drones and surveillance of
our submarine Presence at that point why don't they just move on Taiwan and try to take it well I I I do understand that there is a lot of uh you know an analysis coming out right now especially on behalf of the military uh experts um not only in the United States but also in other parts of the world pointing to this realistic scenario that we may see
a military attack by China on Taiwan by not later than 2027 and why 2027 because it is being anticipated as the year when China will be able to catch up militarily with the United States and I do not share this assessment I just don't see why uh you know China will have to take such a big risk in achieving something that it can
achieve in a much smarter and more efficient way what do I mean by that I call this approach a that by Thousand Cuts that's that would mean that China could spend a little bit longer um in a slow but steady political social economic and societal penetration of Taiwan and it is you know you could we could argue it's the old Soviet Playbook um it could be done in a more
subtile way using um plausible deniability it could be you know Taiwan is still uh the most successful the democracy in uh in the Indo Pacific uh that means also it is vulnerable to this kind of penetration where you can practically use um agents provocator provocators on the ground you can buy up a lot of uh uh institutional or uh
individual players you can you know start um doing all this subversion process in a let's say longer time frame but it could bring about uh bigger success than actually risking uh military intervention uh which uh is not you know not giving you um I would even say 50 50% of success um the terrain of Taiwan if we compare compare it with the most let's
say with the most phisticated War that's going on right now uh is much more difficult you have a very very limited um window uh to attack uh in the case of Taiwan uh this window of opportunity is limited only to probably two uh periods in the whole year which of course is also known by everyone in the region and that
particularly means uh the defense of Taiwan one you have uh window of opportunity in April and then in October so you cannot attack at any you know uh time in the year uh it is um sophisticated military attack that it's cannot be conducted on the whole of the island and even though that uh China is catching up militarily right now I think
that the mindset of this Chinese leadership the way how the Chinese leadership is per you know is actually conducting strategy um does contradict such risky IND davor um again um because time is on China's side and China only needs to really prepare this some of minor actions in a longer period of time at least this is what I would uh actually uh do uh as a
as a strategist which would promise a much uh you know better percentage of uh success than uh like I said an adventurous military attack now we may argue that under unanticipated circumstances for the political leadership think of a situation where the political stability uh in China is shaken where the Chinese leader siin ping is somehow put into the
corner to take a very um let's say um ad hoc decision on the matter because of certain circles of the hwks of the military hulks of course we have this kind of possibility as well uh it could be a Black Swan event something that has happened in China and this makes him you know take this decision in order to draw the attention away from
internal problems um and foreign policy Adventures are Al always kind of you know Gathering the public uh support so it's not 100% to be excluded but in my scenario I would actually point to rather uh you know as I explained this um Deb by thousand CS approach rather than military attack uh on Taiwan are we now in a world where the laws of war are
basically obsolete so Putin is acting in Ukraine without restraint k civilians the conflict in the Middle East whatever one might think of it there's clearly a lot of disagreement about it so the ICC the morning of this recording is bringing charges against Netanyahu in the Israeli government the United States government does not really recognize
that as legitimate do we have international law anymore at all well we have international law but uh in the world of uh you know real politic and geopolitics the the strong uh the strong do what they want and the weak suffer what they must and this is the principle unfortunately that more or less overwrites international law norms and rules and
right now in this gray um area of um let's say of a of a inter ministic International System so the old International System is crumbling down and the new inter National system is trying to uh to to um to be born so we are in this um say let's say a stadium of an emergence of a new global system in which each and single field including
the international law we see it also with International organizations such as the United Nations the United Nations Security Council is a perfect example for it where we have clear uh you know bipolarization bifurcation of uh the club between China and Russia on the one hand and uh United States France and UK on the other and the same goes for all
these International bodies uh and that is that is to say that they are being of course used on both sides and at the same time they are being you know misused unfortunately that is the reality we we are right now we are in um this period of international relations where the number of international military conflicts and Wars hasn't been
that high since the end of uh the Cold War so it's the highest number of military conflicts and Wars we have a lot of as you said casualties we have um I argue we are going to have even more tensions and more military conflicts in the next years to come with this year 2024 being extremely volatile um and in a sense uh I'm not surprised
that we are in this situation where both sides are trying to instrumentalize Legal Norms rules standards but to no avail because in the end uh up until we do not have uh let's say u a new winner or new emerging blocks with their reading of international uh law with their understanding of uh organizational principles with their structures um we
will be in this gray zone of uh interpretation and misinterpretation and practically uh There is almost no common ground in between we do see that there is no more uh Global po you know policemen uh uh Power that can decide over the end of military conflicts or Wars uh at the same time we also see that um more or less the narratives that
are coming uh from both sides are equally being uh instrumentalized because uh on the one hand right now you mentioned the case of uh the Middle East in fact I argue that uh the war between Israel and Hamas probably will find its way by the end of this year as compared to some other tensions that will be still ongoing and like the war for
instance in Ukraine which will still be ongoing in the next uh several years uh but here we have a clear case where uh you see that the West United States European Union powers are supporting Israel and countries like China Russia are actually supporting the Palestinian uh uh the Palestinian question and I argue that in the end probably uh this
kind of balance balancing act will uh be uh the positive influence on finding a two-state solution for this uh conflict with devastating humanitarian consequences for the Palestinian people without a doubt let's say that Putin manages to take and then keep something like a third of Ukraine and then there's an uneasy truce uh what would Putin do
next is it salki Gap is it Lithuania is it Eastern Estonia is it mova play out the scenario in that case okay so first let's start with the calculus what Putin wants I would like to give you my assessment uh as to what's going on there and what's been going on there for quite some time now now first and foremost uh Putin wants
the whole of Ukraine not just oneir of Ukraine or 20% right now Russia controls around 18% uh no they want all of it and if it's necessary they will just make you know 10 to 15 years plan how to slowly but surely subjugate the whole of Ukraine that means in a similar way how it's been proceeded since 2014 you had practically um a series of military
actions uh followed by cire followed by some kind of negotiations Then followed by military actions and and repeat tactics this was the case for uh almost 10 years and due to this you know um kind of strategy Russia was able to military militarily control uh Eastern uh the you know Eastern uh Ukraine and then uh it could seize the opportunity to make uh a
move uh of course I have to say that in my assessment um from from from December 2021 um I was pointing to uh a scenario in which I was absolutely sure that there will be a war but um I actually even called this war a limited Military operation and I thought this was my mistake that the war will uh start in the east and south of uh of Ukraine um I
did not think that Putin will make an Allin move in 20 22 this is I must say um was a mistake on my side because as I said uh I I I was seeing this as a 10 to 15 years plan how to slowly uh subjugate the country uh why did he make uh a you know o win uh move and he practically uh launched the full scale war from five
directions uh well I think it's too early to make all these assessments uh but uh certainly um I would argue the regional um environment um and situation um prior to 2022 and also the global environment that means think of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan then think of you know uh elections in key European countries uh in 2021 there was a
political um let's say vacuum uh until New governments were built we had you know key election in Germany uh this is uh as you know meanwhile the key uh provider of support for Ukraine so uh we had the worst energy crisis in 2021 already looming in uh in Europe and uh we had the worst uh actually indicator for uh food prices uh this is the F
index that was reaching already levels of 2011 in December so all of these were you know Regional and global environment indicators that probably uh LED also to this decision but more importantly what Putin got uh was also this um you know Assurance of comprehensive um if you like full scale comprehensive support coming from China he has been building
up this modus vendi with kin ping since 2013 when kin ping came to power and he knew that by launching a fullscale war and this is my personal assessment of course he would not just trigger the uh systemic competition between United States and China China at that time was not ready for that kind of um you know um fast speeded competition which
meanwhile as we know has accelerated to the point of the introduction of um uh tariffs and the decoupling has really really been triggered but also um you know to in in a sense um putting correctly B on China that China was even even if not um you know agreeing with the the whole decision would actually uh would uh would support Moscow in this
inavi as it turned out so going back now to your question I just wanted to make this clarifi clarification what would be the next step right what would be the next on his agenda now again um first and foremost what is on his agenda is that he will not give up on attacking Kev and attacking you know Odessa and trying to uh get as much as possible
from Ukraine and if he's not able for whatever reasons uh we cannot debate now about uh technical issues of you know the technicalities of the War uh Russia has been adapting but Russia has also made a lot of mistakes Ukraine has been adapting in the war but in reality right now they are attacking the second largest city uh kke but obviously
they're also attacking Odessa and like I said my um expectation is that there will be attack in KF again so let's assume even if partially successful or fully successful but let's assume um Putin succeeds in getting U large part of Ukraine and then we have some sort of negotiations some sort of ceasefire and then negotiations and like I said this
is the best case scenario from Russia's point of view because uh every time when there were ceasefire agreements and uh you know any kind of uh negotiations in this case this will also legitimize uh the Russian territorial gains um this ceasefire has always been violated so in a sense this is actually um you know plac into the into the uh cards of
Russia will I mean this is the main question will Russia actually attack other um countries in Europe right am I understanding correctly your question to split NATO right so if Putin hates NATO and holds a grudge against NATO he'll want to take some marginal action that will split the NATO Coalition not so dramatic that everyone is against him so
something like say send an army group into Eastern asonia claim there's ethnic turmoil side with the Russian minority tell a bunch of lies and then work to subvert the baltics is that in the cards to come next or not yes absolutely if I were him or if I were to consult him and you know uh he's successful in his um in
his action so far why would he not try it I mean first and foremost uh the baltics um I think that they already understand uh the high risk of uh such situation uh in fact we have to split it in two parts the one part being uh neighbor uh neighboring countries like mova and Georgia and there uh I would also go for you know territories because
I have already the military presence I have already I mean from Russia's point of view um territories like uh transnistria which is neighboring uh Odessa and practically will enable a sanitary cordone with the European Union but also uh in Georgia with the sweeping uh borders in South otia uh for instance and abasia uh I would just go for these
territories because this is you know about status and about uh um uh great power exercise and in the next step I would actually consider um doing something like this like an attack on a on the Baltic because first and foremost uh there will be a certain uh Regional um Regional environment that will allow it what do I mean by that if
let's say uh the members of uh NATO and the European Union are somehow in conflictual uh blocks because of uh the future of uh you know this uh organizations I mean we do not talk about uh 2024 obviously but in the next years uh the European Union has as a block will undergo major shifts and a lot of troubles and you know the member states will probably not be um so
coherent in their positions all the time and the same goes for NATO especially if we have a very very different us leadership so under these circumstances uh provocation like this would mean to test the Article Five to to let's say to use the opportunity to show that article 5 uh of NATO is not really going to be activated this is a
possibility I would say uh right now from today's point of view uh it is absolutely possible and to some extent probable but not plausible but in the next few years depending on the success of uh of Russia in Ukraine uh and I mean the uh time uh frame of 2025 2026 I would not exclude as I said such possible and probable act by Russia for instance on the balticum
not so much on Poland I do not take this um really seriously as some analysts appointing attack an attack on Poland I would also think that um uh Poland may actually seek um to get uh nuclear weapons so in the case if Poland decides to go nuclear uh this um you know um this question will be automatically answered as to whether Russia would be
eager to attack Poland no I know this is a highly speculative question but if you had to guess where would strategic nuclear weapons most likely be used next what would be your pick first and foremost I want to stress that uh the risk of the use of nuclear weapons has not grown bigger with all the nuclear blackmail with all the threats that you know
nuclear weapons will be used coming from Russia we saw a precedent in the international relations uh in you know modern times that a country uh obviously a great power tries to legitimize territorial gains by uh by the threat of uh you of the use of nuclear weapons but this risk the the the risk of of the realistic use of nuclear weapons hasn't
grown bigger that's the first thing that I really want to stress that uh I still don't see uh actually uh nuclear war uh taking place um okay second Point Russia has a lot of conventional weapon systems that it is obviously already using against Ukraine uh and it doesn't need actually the the tactical nuclear weapon against Ukraine but it doesn't have to
be Ukraine and I mean a strategic nuke so say North Korea if they're approaching some kind of strange endg game or if American forces are doing badly in the South China Sea and we're tempted to take out a fleet of Chinese warships using a nuke or of all the scenarios you can imagine which is the one that would surprise you least
um maybe actually the use of tactical nuclear weapon by Russia against Ukraine if you outline all these scenarios uh I just do not anticipate the United States using the nuclear weapon think of all the military defeats that the United States had you know experienced over the decades and they still did not use the nuclear weapon be Vietnam or Afghanistan
or you know whatever kind of uh military Endeavors they had um North Korea I think that North Korea would not uh go for the nuclear weapon because the moment when they decide this they will be annihilated uh not by one but but by two um critically important players uh because the whole Lifeline for North Korea is coming from China and by
extension from Russia and neither China nor Russia will actually allow small player in the international relations to use the nuclear weapon because there is a scalability in the international relations you know you are allowed as a small you know smaller player to do some uh some step you know to do some steps to create some Havoc uh in uh the
regional environment if it's in the interest of some of you know your supporters as it is the case right now with North Korea why is North Korea receiving all this technological transfer and whole the whole political and diplomatic support from countries like China and Russia well it's obvious because uh activating the North Korean
cart um plays into the carts of Beijing and Moscow because North Korea creates tensions in the Indo Pacific and overstretches the attention of the US leadership uh it also complicates the situation with South Korea and South Korea together with Japan are the most important uh uh indopacific allies of the United States so so long as North
Korea uh you know plays its cart smartly and in its um allowed let's say uh scope of activities uh things will be fine but I just don't see why North Korea would be actually eager to use a nuclear weapon um maybe just because we are at the level of speculation right um uh if we are at the level of speculation one region that would probably
see uh nuclearization will witness more nuclearization is actually the Middle East because Iran has never been closer to getting the nuclear weapon and given the most recent uh uh escalatory path between Israel and uh Iran Israel has the nuclear weapon Iran still doesn't have the nuclear weapon we may argue that this could be one such scenario
again I don't see I don't consider it to be uh probable um but because you want me to speculate uh I will do this uh with uh big pleasure uh just to you know for the sake of intellectual exercise to let's say um outline a scenario in which Israel would consider using the nuclear weapon for the sake of not allowing Iran to so now a question about your work at
face so we're recording a day after the Iranian helicopter crash and we don't know what happened it might have just been a helicopter crash because of bad weather and fog but surely you have clients calling you messaging you pigging you wanting to know what's going on what is it you do in the course of the day to be able to respond to them
coherently like what concrete steps do you take to have a message that is more interest interesting or more informative than what they might see on Twitter uh well first and foremost uh what I post on Twitter is not what I actually discuss with my clients uh uh of the record that's very important because I have uh um networks I have 25
years of uh professional background and I have networks of people who have uh uh uh proven you know track of um of analysis and assessment and uh are very often also on the ground so what I do is to of course uh get uh as credible information as possible um and uh my clients uh usually ask exactly this kind of questions as you do right now will there be in the
case of uh you know the example you gave will there be an escalation uh between Israel and Iran will there be a political turmoil in Iran following this uh helicopter crash will there be a next you know uh military uh let's say episode between Israel and Iran what will be the cascading effects beyond the region or the question that you asked about the
military conflict um and the possible military attack uh on Taiwan this is a questions that come come out almost every day but um uh you know practically what I post on Twitter um is linked to information I read these are open source uh analysis and um and mostly assessments by other colleagues or uh articles being published and I just read
go through these sources and I post and comment uh that's not uh the same as when you have to uh give an answer to uh to a client uh who have for who has uh certain exposure uh in a particular region or has an Investment Portfolio and this Investment Portfolio is for instance affected by certain uh you know military conflicts and so on and so
forth so it's a very different uh you know different uh way of uh let's say Consulting um Twitter um which is now ex is just for fun this is my um you know rescue from the day because uh the whole day I just read and read and read you know the a lot of sources a lot of information I have a lot of uh uh chat rooms on various um you know uh
platforms telecommunication platforms of course with the time I can uh easily identify whether the source is uh credible or not I use five different languages so it's very very uh very um kind of diverse way of uh getting uh uh getting uh information uh I know for instance when it comes to a certain conf uh conflict or certain region which uh you know
sources to use and which uh uh which platforms uh you know are credible that is a very very um different kind of approach uh if for instance a a common user on Twitter would just check on Twitter start reading through the sources so thanks to this kind of uh uh long-term experience it's very easy for me to track and understand you know what
is credible what not but uh you know this is only one of uh several um pillars of my activities at uh face so yes I have private clients within uh face but uh this are individuals uh from different backgrounds uh different you know Prof profs who are mostly interested in this world of geopolitics and uh you know do not have uh the same amount of time to
read and to go through all the sources and they just uh rely on uh my assessment uh for specific uh topics now I must also highlight that uh the daily business of politics is not my main field my main field is actually the long-term 10 10 to 15 years uh macro perspective I actually uh draw scenarios for the future of international
relations and for the future of the relations between great powers for instance China United States or Russia China or India China and so on and so forth for the next 10 to 15 years uh thanks to uh Trends and risk analysis and this is something that is derived from the daily uh you know daily business of politics but in fact it's a
different methodology and this different methodology is not helpful for let's say uh for uh techical developments it is helpful if you for instance consider long-term oriented uh investment based or derived from this macro uh analysis what do I mean let me give you one example um if now people are talking about uh semiconductors right and an investment
in semiconductors would be very very smart investment I have invested in semiconductors six seven years ago be knowing that there will be actually a bifurcation of the global system and one of the critical areas of it will be uh semiconductor so having the trend projections the long-term TR projections in mind helps you to get the big picture
in the long run if you're of course patient and if you really need if you really want to play this game you know the long game and this is where I'm located mostly not at the Tactical level do you find prediction markets or metaculus useful at all I do not do any predictions that is the whole point but they're information
sources you could incorporate into say a 10 to 15 year forecast or do you just think they don't contain much extra information so the big difference is that you know predictions for instance you have like this big prediction houses when it comes to elections for instance right and they try to predict the outcome of Elections and contrary to
predictions I anticipate possible Futures I do foresight not uh not predictions not forecast so I I cannot forecast anything what is foresight foresight is practically to um you know thanks to the Daily observation of events and developments to Cate categorize this uh events and developments into Trends to assess a possible Trend projection that will
point to a certain direction in which for instance the global system goes what do I mean by global system because I really I'm really focused on the macro perspective in my case the global system this is my own concept concept that I've been working uh with uh since 2014 and that is that practically all the relevant socioeconomic networks uh
you take Global Finance system you take Global um Energy System you take the global Finance uh trade um economy agriculture so this most relevant socio economic systems that have emerged specifically because of uh the uh globalization the last globalization wave uh following the collapse of the Soviet Union uh in the introduction of uh the most of the countries into a
let's say a global capitalist system so they are now meanwhile uh more or less intertwined um and looking at uh the interactions between these uh networks and U looking at um you know the way how these systems are undergoing transformation uh gives me some answers um as to you know in which direction it goes let me give you an example most of
the analysts you would agree have been pointing at least for the last 20 years uh towards multipolarity so the most the biggest cliche that we've been uh hearing is that we are sliding into a multipolarity order we have uh several big uh U you know centers of power several great powers and so on and so forth and I just I I've never B into
this uh and since 2014 when I started looking at this uh macro perspective um based on This Global uh system concept I've developed I saw that practically we have only two uh centers of power and everything in between is in this gray Zone that is oscillating between United States on the one hand and China on the other now Russia I argue has taken sight
already in 2014 in in fact Russia has been saved by China following the first interv you know intervention in Ukraine uh and following the first launch of Western sanctions uh when Russia was uh you know facing a serious almost precarious economic situation was saved by China now meanwhile most of these middle powers are still avoiding uh
taking sights they want to capitalize from both roads uh classic example right now is the case of India India is um acting as a bridge as a geopolitical bridge between the two ant antagonists trying to take the best of you know of Both Worlds uh but um um it is very very how to say uh difficult to bring this long-term picture that is
you know to play out in the next five or 10 or 15 years um to the Daily business of politics why because people are just not following they just don't have the time to follow all these Trends and then don't have the time to you know go into all these um uh specific uh systemic processes so when I was talking about bipolarity in 2015 or
when I was talking about the dragon bear since 2014 the dragon bear being this mod vend of China and Russia as uh you know um modus opendi to coordinate without the necessity to enter any strategic Alliance um you know people were not interested because it did not really affect the daily life of politics but now you would uh agree that
China Russia uh you know AIS or whatever kind of articles are almost you know uh coming uh coming out on a daily uh on a daily base and we are already talking about decoupling and we are already discussing you know this kind of bipolarity this is the point so we have a 10 years of time span that I have been investing every day into trying to get
the trend projections correctly but it is absolutely not possible to convince anybody else of of of you know of the correctness of this assessment uh so long as the reality doesn't you know kick in and proves you right and this is what was happening at least with most of my assessments uh and this is how I right now not stuck in 2024 I'm already in
2030 2040 and so on and so forth so most of my assessment um is actually helping clients to prepare for the long-term uh for the long-term you know perspective um I'm not a consultancy like most of these consultancies providing these daily you know briefs and uh and Analysis telling you about the Dynamics in a specific country uh explaining you
the constellations between the political actors and whatsoever which is equally important I'm not denying the importance uh on the opposite is just that uh what I do is so rare and you know right now uh a lot of I'm observing a lot of consultancies like the big consultancies Goldman Sach so on and so forth are trying to enter this you know business
of foresight uh geopolitical foresight with big teams and trying you know to foresee the future but in the end I would argue it's U um you know a methodology that is not so easily to be conducted and especially it's not easily to be conducted because you have to um you know free yourself from any kind of uh um uh biases personal biases and you
have to have a model uh now we may argue some have developed uh indexes like the geopolitical Risk Index that is now being let's say uh published by the Federal Reserve they try to track uh track back different uh headlines in various news uh uh papers and magazines and then they you know based on the number um empirically they just point to
the severity of geopolitical risk like it happened with the you know with the russan war against Ukraine uh we have different kind of metrics um algorithmic and empirical one uh my Approach is very qualitative one and it's really based and derived from what I just uh explained to you Felina chakarova thank you very much thank you