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[Applause] [Music] [Applause] [Music] conversations with Tyler is produced by the mercada center at George Mason University Bridging the Gap between academic ideas and real world problems learn more at arcades.in videos transcripts and
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upcoming dates visit conversations withth tyler.com [Music] I'm here to today with my colleague John NY who is a renowned economic historian professor of Economics at George Mason University he holds a chair at the mercus center and he is also
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International adviser to higher School of economics in Moscow John welcome thank you Tyler let's start with a few questions about France and French economic history it's commonly believed that from the 17th through 19th
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centuries French per capita income was about 70% that of Great Britain why was France poorer if indeed you accept those numbers it's complicated but the simple story is France was more agricultural England urbanized much more quickly and
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France covered a much larger area with a larger population they had a much more diverse population than Britain did but mostly I'd say the answer has to do with France having lower agricultural productivity and being more heavily
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rural than England was and why did it take longer for France to urbanize this is a bigger issue I think it has a lot to do with their AR M of their property rights and the difficulties of transferring of moving people from the
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land to the cities was the backwardness of French agriculture a reason why to this day France in some ways has better food than Great Britain you know I'm not sure about that there's a lot of discussion about this but certainly I'd
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say the regional nature of the agriculture contributed to a lot of what we think of as good food but it's not just that I'm not going to get into it since that's really one of these big long drawn out debates in economic
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history isn't fully basically nobody quite agrees on some of these issues of why France was behind England and how much was it behind if at all so if the French during these centuries are poorer why are relatively so few of them moving
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to the new world compared for instance to Germans or British for that matter well one of the issues is why aren't they moving at all to the city one way to think about that is that French industrial production is much closer in
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productivity to English industrial production that is per capita whereas French agricultural production well through the 19th century is below that of England per capita and or Britain per capita and yet there's a much slower transformation of French agriculture into industry some of that may have to do with various kinds of land taxes and regulations that encourage people to stay on the land and discouraged investment in the cities but it's very
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unclear it is exactly one of those big puzzles in French economic history that uh people are still worrying about and it's not unlike the problem of structural backwardness in a lot of poorer countries today and when was it
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exactly that France caught up to Britain in terms of per capita income and how was that fundamental underlying immobility somehow neutered or erased well depending upon whom you believe some people say it doesn't until the 60s that they fully catch up and uh it's
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it's unclear about this but you know the numbers are kind of I would sort of say things are a bit blurry in in the early 1900s but uh probably it's not till the 19 some time in the early 20th century that they fully catch up and we think of
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France or at least I do as having a fairly high quality bureaucracy and quality Civil Service where does that come from in French economic or political history a lot of that has to do with the old Imperial tradition and
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with the French basically creating the beginnings of the modern education system to some extent what the revolution did was they took a number of the old Imperials and turned them into what are now known as the gr so you have the poly
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technique and you have normal Superior and you have and part of what they did is that they turned these into feeding grounds for the state but also as means of attracting the best in the brightest no matter where they came from they were
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for example one of the earliest to make say mathematics an important part of the curriculum instead of just say Latin and Greek as it was more common in the British Elite schools and so the Pol technique which was developed During the
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Revolution produced many of the major political leaders of France in the 19th and 20th Century so if we go say to early 19th century France and we just look at quality of economists and quality of thought on free trade are the
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French ahead or behind of the British H that gets a little tricky but I'd say they're a little bit behind the British but not not very much you have basa you have Jean Baptist say and mathematical economics you have mathematical by the
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late that's late middle 19th century then the French are fully equal I mean you have Coro of course who Coro mathematically probably develops a lot of the things we tend to think of as modern economics the way we do Monopoly
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analysis simple Monopoly Supply demand these are all Coro as well as duopoly and so forth and so on but uh overall it's not as integrated as the group in in in Britain but they're very similar now you've argued that we've underrated
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how free trade France was throughout much of the 19th century what exactly is the myth there and how would you describe the reality well that's a long project I worked on for oh over 15 years of my life and it led to my 2007 book
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War wine in taxes and it comes to it starts from the fact that when I early on in my career I was doing some work in Second Empire France and looking at their tariff policies and one of the things I did routinely was to compare
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average tariffs in Britain and France something which appar at the time I was doing it no one had ever bothered to do and one of the things that shocked me was that from about the 1850s on or certainly the 1860s to the end of the 19th
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century France had in fact much earlier going back to the 30s France seemed to have lower average tariffs than the British did for I would say three qus of the 19th century it's not till the end of the 19th century that Britain catches
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up with France in terms of openness of trade and that led me to investigate both why this important fact was so misunderstood in economic history that the French were de facto Less protectionist in many ways than Britain for say more than half of
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the century and why people didn't notice that amid all the Fanfare about the Corn Laws and what are the intellectual origins of this myth of free trade Britain where does it come from are we overrating the British in every other way or there some specific spe reason well the specific reason there definitely has to do with the corn loss W with the repeal of the Corn loss Britain also repealed lots and lots of tariffs but if you go back first
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noticed this that they removed lots of tariffs but often on things they were a trivial part of trade in contrast many of the tariffs that even Adam Smith complained about The Wealth of Nations in particular the wine tariffs were not
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touched and when the British often proposed bilateral free trade agreements with both France and Spain the first things the French and the Spanish asked for was to nego renegotiate tariffs on wine and the British said no no we can't
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touch that and so they said well those are our big experts to you how do you expect us to have a free trade agreement so that killed any attempt to have bilateral trade I think the modern analogy would be to think about Japan
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Japan could negotiate completely open tariffs on every manufactured item but so long as they kept agricultural tariffs and there heavy constraints in fact virtual prohibitions on the US right in many cases there's not much change there
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and that's what Britain did Britain had a comparative advantage in manufacturers so they were willing to go to free trade in manufacturers but they were very very protectionist when it came to consumption items in particular
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beverages wine but also all alcoholic products rum sugar tea coffee Etc if Elites have so much influence over trade policy why is it that that Britain got rid of the Corn Laws at all because the Americans were one of the major
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beneficiaries it hurt some British interest groups why did that happen I I think part of the reason for that is that the the long 19th century is a period in which the industrialists are becoming much more important and you
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have two two aspects about this the bilateral agreement in 1860 between Britain and France allows Britain to get access now to French markets in terms of their manufacturers by having the French remove their prohibitions and lower
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their tariffs but it also is a world in which increasingly those who were benefiting from some of these uh restrictions wanted to have them removed as as Freer trade was being more and more favorable to Great Britain finally
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I think the other thing that occurred is that people forget that initially the wine tariffs which go back to the late 1600s and early 1700s were primarily protections they were an attack on France but because of the high tariffs the British were able to impose very
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high taxes on domestic alcohol in particular things like beer but also gin whiskey Etc and they became so dependent on the revenues from those alcoholic products that in fact one of the things that happened is even when the consensus
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was growing for liberating T trade in alcohol there were still concerned about tariffs and so the rise of the income tax and other forms of Taxation gave them increased leeway to make these changes so as you know in today's
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America there's a major debate between bilateral and multilateral approaches to free trade and and most intellectuals maybe without even thinking about it very much they tend to think the multilateral approach is necessarily
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better what is it you think we learned from the 19th century experience well I think in the 19th century in fact one of the things I do know about the 19th century is that there's no evidence that either unilateral free trade or
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multilateral did very much almost all the free trade in Europe in the 19th century was a product of initially the bilateral trade agreement between Britain and France sometimes known as the Anglo France Treaty of Commerce of
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1860 in which they each agreed to much more liberalized trade on a most favored nation basis once they accepted this then what happened is anyone who signed on to either Britain or France on the most favored nation basis then bought
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into in some sense this system and what's interesting is that after the corn loss Britain is telling everybody to unilaterally lower their tffs cuz free trade's so good and the French and the Spanish are screaming what about
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your wine tariffs but then in 1860 the negotiate this secret treaty between England and France or Britain and France again I have to keep repeating even though it's called angl French treaty and suddenly pretty much every Power in Europe joins in within the decade
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virtually all the major powers in Europe are locked into a free trade agreement with Britain and France because they're afraid of being left out because the two major powers on the continent have negotiated this treaty in fact the only
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Western power who seiz their T's rise is the United States thanks to the Civil War is there a b atal approach to trade agreements that today could give us Freer trade than multilateralism I think it certainly hasn't been tried for
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example I'm just throwing this from out of nowhere if the US were to negotiate a genuinely strong bilateral agreement with the UK and perhaps one Asian partner I wouldn't be surprised if that would essentially create huge incentives
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for most of the EU and large chunks of Asia to join in thinking about economic history more generally if we look at at America today and if our goal is economic growth what would you say is America's biggest institutional deficit
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what institution would benefit us the most if it were to marginally increase in status would it be University Family Church business something else what's gone wrong in America from a moral ideological point of view well that's
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getting into too many things but if we just stick to things I personally care very deeply about I would like to see a return to more an earlier period of pure meritocracy I would like to see that much more both at the level of
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University at companies and so forth and so on I would like to sort of see objective tests and standards used to judge quality whenever possible and I think that the rise of an anti-rac notion or the idea that meritocracy
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should be adjusted for social needs has made it very hard to have I think state-of-the-art production in many areas what do you think of the argument that people are in some ways not morally strong enough to live with meritocracy
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so you think of the Chess World people have ratings the ratings really do reflect how good a player you are and Adam Smith himself suggested that when quality is transparent people will tend to be depressed he compared the mathematicians to The Poets and said The
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Poets were happier because each could believe he was a great poet are we strong enough to live with meritocracy I think the problem with that is the following I think I agree with you that really upsets people and for that reason
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we don't see meritocracy in most venues even in Academia but I I think the real problem as you get in the United States is given the ethnic and cultural diversity of the United States is then what you get is you get tribalism along
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lines that recreates many of the things that I think the liberal Republic was designed to get rid of and so you basically recreate factionalism some questions from American economic history if we think of the decline of slavery in
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the 19th century and then the Civil War was that the result ultimately of economic factors or it simply was political force and there was a war and the South lost but was slavery evolving out of the South for economic Reasons
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I'm not an expert in this area so I'm just going to recite the consensus and I believe the consensus is that purely economic factors weren't going to drive it out at least in the short of the medium run perhaps over another Century
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it would have but the evidence as at least it was presented to me in economic history classes which I haven't always kept up with suggest that the political factors were very important in getting rid of it including the war if you think
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more generally about 19th century economic growth the numbers we have for GDP growth they often don't appear impressive is it that growth actually was slow the numbers are wrong the big effect was simply getting more people
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into the country how do you interpret the 19th century American episode slavery aside the growth of the rest of the country well I think I think American growth was quite impressive I mean 2 and a half% averaged over like a
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century or century and a half is quite a lot of growth in fact especially if you take into account the standard biases and the way in which GDP does things and moreover I think there was slow growth in the sense that you were integrating a
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large very poor population both domestically and through immigration and all these things contributed to what looks like slow growth but it's not really slow growth by historical standards and I don't see that's a surprise at all moreover we tend to
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overvalued the ways in which the first Industrial Revolution transformed things most of the big growth boost comes in the second half of the 19th century in what people call the Second Industrial Revolution if you look at the statistics
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for the first Industrial Revolution there's no evidence that the workers living standards dramatically improved till about the 40s or 50s by I mean the 1840s or 1850s so that if you if you say date the Industrial Revolution to 1760
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What You observe is very slow growth in England fast in comparison to what had happened in previous centuries but slow into what happens today and even slower for the working classes and you only see this acceleration that we think of as
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modern economic growth in the western states in particular Britain France the US and Germany starting in the 1850s and 60s or so and what Spurs that second wave is that fossil fuels or something else well I think there it's I think the glomeration of mass urbanization industrialization Innovation across the board in multiple manufacturing everything is not just fossil fuels railroads steam technology you know production greater trade all these
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things are are coming together and now you're sort of seeing what we think of in these big waves of changes and things of that sort and do you view American 19th century history as having had a resource Bounty or a resource curse I
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think the evidence is strong there again this is not my area but the evidence is that that is one case in which United States had institutions that were good enough to take advantage of the resource Bounty now if we think about the first
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Industrial Revolution in Britain many factors driving that Revolution have been cited ideology call population growth and demographics building of a culture of science and engineering and so on what's the underrated Factor behind the first Industrial Revolution luck luck and what is the good luck what's the lucky event not being invaded or yeah I think or not having a the war turn out worse I mean Britain was at War for 50% of the 18th century
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and up through that's up up to the early 1800s and I think in many ways one of the things we underestimate is the extent to which the wars in Europe did not lead to Greater destruction if something had led to a sort of a more
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cataclysmic kind of event if Napoleon had won the war but then there had been a fight back you might have had a far greater I don't know upheaval I mean it sounds fancifully science fiction today but I really think that Europe has
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benefited from an extreme degree of political and economic competition but Extreme political and economic competition is beneficial if you don't destroy the underlying order that makes competition and Innovation possible in
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the first place Frank fukiyama has suggested that whether Britain or England I'm not sure but had a more mature State early on along with Denmark and this is why they were not successfully invaded they were fiscally strong they could build a Navy they
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didn't lose any of those wars in the sense of being conquered do you agree with his argument do you think that was luck no I I don't think it's luck but I I think there's there's a number of things to consider to to begin with the
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fact that Britain is you need to cross the water to get to Britain is an advantage in their favor I think in much the same way Britain had some of the advantages Japan had in Asia where that the Chinese were never able to overwhelm
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Japan for similar reasons I mean having to cross the channel it was non-trivial given older Technologies and it was not an easy thing to conquer Britain in the same way that it wasn't easy for Britain hang on to Normandy or England to hang
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on to Normandy I mean I think the the geography matters but secondly England did have a more centralized State earlier but that was made possible by fiscal reforms which is another thing I discussed in my book War wiing taxes
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talks about the fact that it's ironic that in the period that we think of as liberal Britain Britain had the fastest growing tax revenues in throughout the 18th century any country in western Europe I mean British tax revenues Rose
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450% from the 1700s through to the end of the 18 century which is remarkable since everybody else was trying to raise their revenues and we're unsuccessful at doing so what do you think of the argument that classical liberal ideology
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was somehow an essential part of the Industrial Revolution I think it played a role but it was also it was one of these Baptist and Bootlegger stories there were both those who ideologically were in favor of Greater liberalism and
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free trade but I don't think they would have succeeded if they hadn't benefited from the venality of many of the ministers who wanted to increase the power of the city and increase the power of the British civil State at the
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expense of the landed aristocracy if you think about it one of the things that improved markets did and in particular improved National markets in agriculture was to make agriculture more efficient but by making it more efficient they
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essentially destroyed the local Monopoly of many agricultural landholders who weren't that very efficient so you had some big Winners but one of the things it did is that it made England a more efficient hold and you get consolidation
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both in terms of the most powerful domestic and Commercial Industries and you get consolidation in agriculture and consolidation in agriculture eventually made it possible for people to move out of Agriculture as well and growth in
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both Agriculture and Industry favored a more powerful Britain but a much weaker set of dispersed aristocratic Elites who all together had the control of the British Parliament but as these dispersed Elites were getting weakened
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both the rise of the state directly through greater regulation and indirectly through having more concentrated in some sense centers of power there's a lot of evidence that British landholders were much more concentrated by the mid 19th century
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than the French were so there was greater inequality in ownership and that was favorable again to certain Elites who benefited from the shift to liberalism now it's often argued that the British economy or maybe it's just
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British companies they fall behind in some regards in the mid to late 19th century do you agree and if so why did that happened this I'm not so sure about I think we see a lot of things there and there you know it's it's hard to tell
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how much of that is what happened inter War period of it and how much of it was the the turn to socialism in around the time of World War II but there's certainly the case that Britain loses some of its innovative Edge on the other
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hand Britain does still play a very big role in ually so I'm not quite sure I understand why Britain underperforms but there there there's something to be said for both a regulatory story and in some sense a breakdown of the state capacity
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having to do with greater conflict between the upper classes and the working classes in Britain now there's a collapse of globalization occurring in 1914 in the first world war if you think about this in terms of an abstract model
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what exactly happened and was it inevitable I don't think it was inevitable at all I do think the war was the World War I was a genuine shock to that that is to sort of say I think that you could have imagined a world in which
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globalization would have received more support and more development for at least a couple more decades but it is also true that I think what you see is that historically there doesn't you know put it another way there's not much
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evidence that human beings somehow evolve into very liberal political entities and so the periods that promote political and economic liberalism tend to be short-lived historically what's interesting about the last 250 years is how relatively
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stable political liberalism has been whether or not that's an anomaly or that's the beginning of a totally different change in the way human beings organize themselves is I think for the future but I think the assumption that
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political liberalism as we've seen that FS both increased individual freedoms as well as increased economic freedoms plus economic growth is either stable or sustainable is not clearcut to me particular mistakes aside what were the
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systemic mistakes the Western world was making in say 1910 1912 well I think the systemic mistake really boils down to how do you deal with the problem of power how do you deal with the problem of different groups different cultures
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wanting their place at the table I mean it's clear that if you look a lot of the fight of imperialism was great great power competition you know if you look in the Far East for example some people may know that the United States took the Philippines from Spain at the end of the period of Spanish control of the Philippines in 1898 and partly this was due to Perry's decision to sail into Manila Bay one of the things that's not discussed is that
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most people are unaware of is that the German and British fleets were waiting in Hong Kong they were waiting to see what the Americans did and it's quite likely that had the Americans not steamed into Manila Bay that the Germans
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or British would have intervened in the Philippines once the Spanish collapsed now in many of these discussions we have an interlude called overrated versus underrated and since you're a polymath I thought we would make ours slightly
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longer than usual are you game uh let's let's let's try Okay Napoleon thei oh vastly underrated why Napoleon thei was you know he's often referred to as he's the nephew of um Napoleon bonapart he's often referred to as The Idiot Emperor
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the little Napoleon and a lot of that has to do with the fact that he's considered to be a bumbler he lost Tran he basically lost Eastern large parts of Eastern France in the franor Prussian War but in fact Napoleon III ushered in
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many of the Great reforms of the 19th century not least of which the 1860 angl French Treaty of Commerce but also under Napoleon the third's regime he was able to promote not just Freer trade but greater industry modern banking a lot of
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what is modern Paris comes about under Napoleon theii the the development of the railroad and the road networks comes on Napoleon third moreover the growth in the wages of the working classes start to increase after after the 1850s the
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the late 19th century contrary to what people think of is not in fact a period of massive inequality but it's a period of Greater consumption equality all across Western Europe and I and certainly in France Napoleon the third
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has a great deal to do with that Filipino food overrated or underrated h and why isn't there more of it in the United States that's good well since I like Filipino food I'd say it's underrated but if we just focus on the question why isn't there more Filipino
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food there are two things to note one is that the biggest reason I would sort of say is that no one has yet found a sufficiently America Centric Filipino food to sell people don't realize think about the most common popular American
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Asian Foods that would be Chinese and when we think of the good Chinese food it's not in fact what made Chinese food a household name the fact that we you and I can buy very good Sichuan or quanton Quant Cantonese food is not a
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function of the best dishes it's a function of the kind of mediocre chowa fried rice which has nothing to do with the chaen or fried rice that you get in Hong Kong and things like Mugu guy pan and sweet and sour pork and because you
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don't have this Mass Appeal food underlying it you can't experiment with the better stuff secondly I don't think Filipinos know how to pick the dishes that are not just good for the Philippines but good for Americans so
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that in particular if you think again think about say even Korean food which is probably the most authentic food I think of in America relative to the home base it's not the same thing even with with the Koreans we focus very Americans
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tend to like stuff like bulgogi and the barbecues and the Fried Chicken boring dishes but but in fact the dishes that a lot of people eat in in Korea are not things most Americans would like to eat on a regular basis which a big emphasis
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on the on the various kinds of kimchi the pickles the hot soups the noodles various kinds of other other kinds of in the same way there's a lot of Asian dishes that are not as common or if you look at Thai food thai food that's
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served in most Thai restaurants has very little to do with what you would eat in Thailand and so I think Filipinos haven't found a way of packaging food that is sufficiently exotic and uniquely Filipino but will appeal to American
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tastes once you can do that then it's possible for I think the more interesting Regional dishes that would also be interesting to Foodies to get invol introduced as well and for those of you who don't know John grew up in
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the Philippines and was born there the movie by Alfred Hitchcock vertigo it's one of the greatest movies of all time is it underrated it is underrated I think despite its high ranking it should be rated even further I mean look at
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this movie it's on all margins is great you know Jimmy Stewart who who is often thought of as this a shocks kind of guy is portrayed in a very dark dark kind of way it's a very modern kind of take on sort of the the the average American as
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well as being very introspective and very suspenseful and there are so many things that other directors steal or take from Hitchcock from the from these pictures I think vertigo rear window To Catch a Thief in North by Northwest are
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all Peerless and if there's an underlying political subtext or import of Hitchcock what do you think that would be not what he necessarily intended as his politics but what's in the movies in terms of human nature and
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political man well I think there's this question of Suspicion and the tendency to not appreciate how much is going on under the surface I think people tend to see these things narrowly in terms of Cold War paranoia but in Hitchcock was a
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political conservative and he he was much more of the very old sort of British conservative view that one should be wary supic is metaphysical right yes exactly that in in times of peace be aware that these things are not
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necessarily self-sustaining I would sort of say that's the conservative world view That civilization and Order are not default states of mankind it's very hubsan the classical pianist Vladimir harowitz overrated or underrated well
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I'm not a musician but for me P Personal Taste I'm I think is overrated why there's a certain flashiness about him and that I much prefer I guess other pianist to here who's the underrated classical pianist then oo that's hard
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you know leati if you don't like harwoods yeah yeah Rubenstein Pini Pini in chess Gil Gil more than Pini okay in chess Magnus Carlson overrated or underrated I think he's neither I think he's properly rated properly rated I think he's properly
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rated yes and is he going to beat Carana you and there I'd say yes probably but two to one I think Carolina has a maybe a one in four maybe not even a one in three one in four chance at most but Carlson is clearly the most phenomenal
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player to come along since Kasparov in the history of ideas John Stewart Mill uh overrated why I think John Stewart Mill's take on liberalism is too much than Ivy Tower take and I think that it doesn't take into consideration it's too
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normative it's too much what should liberalism be about as opposed to what I think of us a lot of my career has been about we just trying to understand what kinds of things made liberal reform possible in the real world what kinds of
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things made liberal reform sustainable in the real world I often talk about it the way I tell my classes something like the following in economics we're always talking about the benefits of free markets the benefits of trade the
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benefits of of open competition and yet by that standard the revealed preference of humanity is to be poor since the periods of really open trade growth and Innovation are very tiny in the long span of world history or Innovations
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take a long time to develop and they're often held back and the waves of innovation and growth often crash on the rocks of stagnation or even failure and so in that sense what you really need to understand is why is it that so hard to
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do what is it about the human condition what is it about the problems of organizing Mankind in the world that includes problems of political organization coercion violence dissent that makes order such a constraint on what is permissible in terms of Freedom
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Russia's economic future are we underrating it no I unfortunately I think Russia suffers very much from two problems one is the well-known problem of resour ource curse I do think that Russia having abundant Oil and Gas makes
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it very hard for them for their political economy to develop properly as for for All the known reasons but the other thing I think is not talked about is that since Russia became such a gigantic Empire in particular in the
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19th century Russia has had such a hard time I would argue the political impetus the imperatives of holding together such a large land mass and all the peoples in it and worrying about its borders overwhelms incentives to promote growth
32:31
and development within the country but the USSR is gone say they would hand over parts of Eastern Russia to China just as a gift write them off I'm not predicting this but let's take this as a hypothetical isn't it then a fairly
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well-defined National unit they have a lot of human capital uh still some good systems of training look but that's different if TR if Russia could hand over two-thirds of its land mass and keep uh a large L chunk of what we think
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of as Western Russia I think it would develop a lot faster but that's exactly what will not happen look forget about handing anything over to the Chinese the Russians don't properly develop Vladivostok they don't properly develop
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the Russian Far East why shouldn't bloody vosta for example just to take it just take it off the top of my head be as fully developed as San Francisco is for for the United States in some sense it's the other Outpost you have lot of
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the Eastern leaders and you have the Western leaders and so what you don't see is you don't see cities in Russia on the eastern part which are advanc as advanced as successful as commercial and as Dynamic both intellectually and
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commercially as Moscow and St Petersburg and their inability to permit that or encourage it or in fact in my view their tendency to discourage it because for various complicated reasons is part of what holds Russia back but if we're
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trying to think through Russian culture clearly there are some things they're very good at so the history during World War II of disassembling and then reassembling factories in the East that was astonishing mobilizing Manpower
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building certain kinds of Tanks pretty quickly and effectively and then in other areas the performance is much weaker do you have a kind of integrated theory of Russian culture that at least partially fits in what the country is
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very good at and very bad at no I don't but what I do think is the following I think that much of the things that are very good about that state capacity are tied to the political constraints that also make it hard hard for them to
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encourage diverse competition and one of the fears they have is and one could argue that this is part of what happened in the 1990s is the breakdown of the worst aspects of the Soviet Empire also broke down some of the many better
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aspects in terms of their ability to provide a high quality say secondary educational system high quality average University quality and to have very good State capacity and so recreating the state capacity while also promoting
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greater economic diversity and economic competition is I think one of the great challenges for Russia what is it you think we know about religion and economic growth if indeed anything I think to the extent that what we think
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was Modern economic growth began in the west and was a very uniquely Western phenomenon in the modern sense only later adapted by Japan and then more recently by many Asian economies it's clear that Christianity played a very
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big role and I think one of the things that say fukuyama mentions in one of his recent books and others have mentioned is the role the Catholic Church played in promoting the nuclear family Banning cousin marriage without special
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permission focusing on um trying to unify romantic love with formal marriage asking for the consent of women in the marriage vows focusing on the need for celibacy and the need for monogamy discouraging polygamy and extended
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family all these things were part and parcel or at least support with what we think of as the underlying institutions that nourished capitalism whether or not say for example a more Eastern phenomen Eastern version of capitalism would be
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risen under China with polygamy with sort of very soft kind of pantheistic religions that's a separate question but as we think of the way in which modern Economic Development has occurred it's also co-evolved with the rise of the
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western state which is tied to the rise of the way in which Christianity played out both as a secular Force as well as a spiritual one the French author Michelle hulc his novel submission why is that an important book well Michelle Welbeck I
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think forgive my pronunciation I mean Welbeck in my view is very interesting in that he's an avowed anti-liberal but what's interesting about him is that he sees two things I think he sees in some sense the loss of confidence in Western
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Traditions that seems to be very typical of many leading Western Elites today and secondly I think he sees the problems that were articulated very differently by people like canes or by shumer about the fact that capitalism evolved in the
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west against a certain background of social religious and cultural norms which are often undermined by the aspect of competition itself in particular Welbeck is very big on the issue of sexual competition and the way in which
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breakdown of the nuclear family the rise of open divorce the sexual Revolution all these things create a market in which you have huge numbers of losers and even without formal polygamy that easy divorce and fairly loose sexual
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morals lead to a world in which you are recreating some form of polygamy and that these lead to stresses that are far go far beyond the standard inequalities that you talk about economically and in many ways are actually more intractable
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than the inequalities economically you could imagine a world in which everyone had a Star Trek reproducer that allowed them to make any physical object available you could get any food you wanted any car any clothing but then
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that would make the inequalities based upon physical characteristics whether they be Beauty And even if you could fix Beauty with plastic surgery you would still have charm and personality and intelligence and power and all these
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things would be would be involved in those and that would be even more intractable talk about meritocracies that you can't do anything about and I think that Welbeck makes that a very big part of his issue about the sense in
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which having an overriding religious belief and having very strong control of family and sexual relations is very appealing to large numbers of people in the world a few questions about the Philippines speaking of religion why has
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the Philippines become so Christian and Catholic in particular when most of East Asia or Asia has not well to begin with basically the Catholic Church colonized the Philippines people may not realize that the Spanish had very little power
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to colonize the Philippines militarily it was very difficult the Philippines has over 7,000 Islands it's quite scattered there a lot of mountains and jungles Spanish soldiers would die of malaria so most of the colonization
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outside the Manila region was often handled by the church in the sense that the church had incentives to send people there and to kind of proze and in the course of priz that they extended the the influence of the the central the
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central Spanish government in addition the military intervened in much the same way they did in a lot of South America more by there were many separate tribes the Philippines was not United and so very often was some of these deals I'll
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help you defeat your enemy in exchange for your you know owing allegiance to the Central Power and things of that sort so but even after these deals were made daytoday christianization education and in some sense homogeneization of
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Filipinos into the greater Philippine nation was often taken care of by priests and the Philippines was formerly divided by the Catholic Church into which areas were controlled by various orders whether the Dominicans the
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benedictines the franciscans or the Jesuits are nations spread across many islands including also Indonesia inherently at a disadvantage for economic development I certainly think they have a disadvantage in terms of some of the issues of State capacity and
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order that are a prerequisite for economic development take mind now in the South which is a constant problem for the Philippines in some ways mind now has never fully colonized that is to say neither the Spanish nor the
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Americans nor even the Japanese during World War II were're able to fully control M now and today it is the scene of many struggles between the Muslims and the Christians there as well as the various kinds of revolutionary factions
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that that still exist in in in mind now I remember having a discussion about this with the distinguished Economist Jim Robinson who wrote a paper about the fact that in mind now you have too many strong men and the problem mind now is
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you have bad institutions and I said Jim you're you're putting the cart before the horse you have bad institutions because it's so hard to run men now so it's not a surprise that the politicians that emerge to in in mind now are those
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who basically are good at forming private armies or making local connections no one group is strong enough to make mind now totally independent and yet no the center in Manila is not strong enough to fully in some sense control that that Island
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either and so that area is has always been a hotbed of political struggle and instability now that China is a true world power and China also tends to use some of the overseas communities of ethnic Chinese to further the ends of
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China as a nation how will relations with the ethnically Chinese minority evolve in the Philippines well that is a big issue because I think there is a suspicion that many of the Chinese are working in the Chinese government's
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interest at the same time there are many ethnically Chinese philippinos who know owe no allegiance to China and are much more loyal to the Philippines and so you're going to get these problems so one of the very big issues is how can
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not just the Philippines but all of East Asia take advantage of often very successful ethnic Chinese minorities without incurring the suspicion that they're being disloyal to the Home Country or or are loyal to China instead
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and the more that I think China tries to intervene in local politics in the region the more you're going to sort of see these kinds of clashes and I worry about this a lot because many of the greatest massacres that have occurred in
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history have occurred by rioting people against ethnic minorities like the Chinese in in India or the Chinese in Southeast Asia what's the untold story of how China itself managed to reform well that is a deep issue but I have a
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theory or rather theory is too strong a word there's a phenomenon I've observed that I really haven't seen written about one of the things that for me is very unique about China that not many people have discussed in any real detail is the
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extent to which China began its reforms outside of the biggest cities just thinking about that alone to begin with guangong and fujian provinces and those regions places like Shenzhen guangong fuen Shaman uh to think about those
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cities and regions is quite remarkable virtually every major reform always involves the major centers of commercial power but those would have been Beijing and Shanghai and they were totally left out of it in my view that occurred for a
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number of reasons one is that by avoiding that you avoid the usual problems political economic problems of interfering with the rents of the established companies second you have plausible deniability if it fails they
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say ah what do you expect you know out the back water third fuen of course is fuen which shares a language and ethnic Heritage with the majority of the people in Taiwan and in guangong is canones which of course shares ethnic Heritage
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in the language we with Hong Kong who are mostly Cantonese and one of the things that's very interesting in the early parts of China's reforms you had investors from abroad mostly from Taiwan and Hong Kong investing in China in a
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period in which China did not have formal property rights family and ethnic connections were often used to make informal social deals to maintain these relations moreover the Chinese government was well aware that if they defaulted in some way then they were
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giving up the future stream of investment that would come from these places so in many ways this was very very unusual the final and most unusual aspect about China's reform is once these new regions started to grow the
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center was not successful in shutting them down you need to understand that throughout history whenever Central Powers saw Regional powers in their countries develop you often crushed it even this this happened in conflict between the
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king and the big city so the B good example is fris the first of France who often had because of the problems that people like Doug North have talked about of credible commitment could not borrow money except with very high interest
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rates but by uniting with the city of Paris he was able to actually borrow at lower interest rates than he could by himself and yet he broke those deals and he allowed himself to go back to higher interest rates because he was fearful
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that Paris becoming too powerful would weaken his authority and in the period particularly of the Reformation seeing people like sort of John Calvin being protected in Geneva uh was a concern that Paris would become a hotbed of
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Reform or hotbed of opposition to the central powers of the French government if I think about the economy of Taiwan on two things that strike me first in International Supply chains Taiwan reaps a pretty high percentage of value added
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but at the same time you've had wage stagnation at the median in Taiwan longer than almost anywhere how do we put the economic picture of Taiwan together I'm not very sure about this but my guess is that in Taiwan there's too much of an incentive to take advantage of the Chinese market of just use cheaper labor or of selling to Chinese rather than thinking about how do we reform Taiwan itself how do we because Taiwan needs many more reforms
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they're very smart people and they're highly developed but somehow Taiwan has not been able to move up the food chain fast enough to develop in some sense very Advanced Technologies and to make Taiwan say an intellectual Hub I I would
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say for example take even universities there's no reason that changa and taida the two leading universities in Taiwan shouldn't be more like the top university in Singapore but they're not and some of this has to do with the
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unwillingness of Taiwanese to switch graduate programs to be much more heavily in English and that there's a certain reluctance to learn English or difficulty that they have on the one hand if you talk to Taiwanese like my
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in-laws they're very much in favor of their kids learning English on the other hand they perceive this as as as impossibly difficult thing unless the kids live in the United States or Australia or England for a certain period of time and so all these things
47:14
swirl together it's not unlike some of the problems Japan has but with the extra problem that Taiwan is torn between their desires to remain reasonably independent while at same time being dependent on making deals
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with the mainland and how is it that you and your wife managed to bring up your son so he could speak Chinese well this is you have to understand that when I first met my wife we met in Paris and I spoke no Mandarin she spoke no English
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and she's from Taiwan right she's from Taiwan eventually I learned conversational Mandarin and she learned English but we noticed that we were going to bring up our son she was very worried about the fact that many of our
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friends who were Taiwanese even though both parents spoke Mandarin and in fact in many cases both parents and speak English very well their kids would grow up not wanting to speak Chinese at all and I chalked this up to the observation
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little kids want to conform and they don't want to be picked on especially if they grow up say speaking Mandarin but then they get picked on in in kindergart or they just feel weird because they're they're answering in a strange language
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so and I did some reading in the literature and what I finally came up with was the suggestion to my wife I said here's what we're going to do for the first two years of his life our eldest son you're only going to speak to
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him in Mandarin and I'm only going to speak to him in English so instead of it becoming a strange language English becomes Daddy's language and Mandarin becomes mommy's language and strangely enough that worked our son became very
48:35
fluid now the downside of it is actually he got confused a bit early on so in some ways some of the Like Preschool said he's a little developmentally handicapped but it was really fun he was he was a little slower and then one day
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it clicked and he was fluent in both in fact he was fluent in Chinese first before English and the funny thing was very often there was a period when he would say everything twice so he would say look airplane tkan Fiji and he would
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just talk about these ways sadly that theory didn't work with our second son because we didn't count on the fact that the second son has the older brother to play with and so the second son has the same phenomenon where he understands
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quite a bit of Mandarin but doesn't want to answer Mandarin let's say that a country with a fair amount of money but not necessarily High credibility in every way and a non-democratic government they appoint you to build a
49:23
university system for them and to create a top worldclass university say it's a gulf nation is it even possible that they try to do this is The credibility gap too strong how much money do they need how would you think about actually
49:37
trying to do this well I think there's two factors one is are they willing to commit the money to it and second are they willing to go through the phase of credibility building that's the hardest thing many people make the early phase
49:49
possible but then they they they falter at the later run and that's the real issue how credible are you going to be with respect even something like tenure is something not very well understood are you willing to fire people before
50:00
they get to tenure and are you willing to guarantee tenure after how do you do that how do you do it so it's credible how many countries cannot even guarantee that the policies instituted by one ruler will be followed by the next and
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this is a very very big issue however I mean a you see a lot trying I mean Singapore has done quite a very good job Hong Kong's done quite a lot the gulf is trying now uh I'm not quite sure with what success but there's surely the king
50:25
Abdullah University of Science and Technology has been hiring a lot of top people in The Sciences but I'm not sure how successful they're they're being at creating a really vibrant University that will attract the best and the
50:36
brightest to come there Russia I am I don't want to talk too much about that because I'm that's partly what I'm involved in Russia as well the Russians have a program to try to in provide incentives for their leading universities to hire on the
50:48
international market and integrate that with local professors and I would say the higher School of economics in Moscow is the most successful uccessful institution University institution in Russia so far at doing that but it's
51:00
still very early in the game and it's it's always a challenge let me ask you just a little bit about what I call the John NY production function economic societ what would be an example of a book that had a great influence over you
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in your life not Doug North no no I not the downward sloping demand curve well I think I told you once that as a boy one of the most influential books to me was the book Memoirs of a sword swallower by Dan manx this is a fairly obscure cult
51:25
book but it's about it's it's autobiography of him running away to the circus or the carnival actually and learning to become both a sword swallower and a fire eater and what was interesting to me about that is that at
51:37
the age of 10 was both the interesting detail at the level of how he got involved in Magic and in the carnival and the functionings of the day-to-day as well as the exoticism with for boy in the Philippines just thinking about the
51:50
way the world would develop and it hadn't I it didn't make me want to run away to the carnival of the circus but made made me think about things in a very very different way and it really it it it spurred my interest in fantasy in
52:00
horror in science fiction were all heavily driven by my interest in that book and what would be a book from the history of ideas more narrowly H that's a little trickier I would say in recent Years the book I've been pondering a lot
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is hobs Leviathan why because I think we've lived through such a period of relative peace and order that we are taking for granted how unprecedented this is despite all the wars that have erupted since World War II there has not
52:31
been a major global conflict at that level in many many nearly what a 3ars of a century now and that's quite unusual and it's also unusual that the number one leading military power has done so little contrary again to what a lot of
52:48
people say about it to expand its power militarily and there are a lot of reasons for that many of them very good both moral as well as practical nonetheless that's an anomaly in world history I think in many ways and I still
53:02
think there's a kind of second law of Thermodynamics for political economy in which disorder has a pull and I worry a lot about the stability of the liberal World Order In The Next Century how much of a pessimist was Hobbs I don't know I
53:20
don't I'm not very good at psychologizing um older writers but there's an optimistic interpret that what he called absolutism which I think is not the same as modern totalitarianism at all it's a strong state of some kind correct that that
53:33
could in fact solve the problem or no well but that's almost like sort of saying let's assume a can opener it's exactly the problem I I mean the thing I'm really frustrated by is that it doesn't matter whether people are writing from a socialist or libertarian perspective too much of the discussion of political economy is normative it's about what should the ideal State be and I'm much more concerned with the questions of what good states are
53:59
possible and once good states are created that are possible what good states are sustainable and that in my view is a still understudied and very poorly understood issue now as you know we have many talented colleagues but probably
54:16
you would count as the best educated amongst the group educated in the broad sense of the term we all have phds to what would you attribute that it's two things one is I was raised and educated in the Jesuit tradition I went to an
54:30
elite Jesuit school in the Philippines growing up and one of the things about that school was that there was a very big emphasis on the kind of educated Catholic gentleman that was supposed to produce so it was not enough to be good in one subject you were presumed to be good in all subjects at the very high level secondly I felt growing up that the Philippines really was an intellectual Backwater and I had this Mythic view in my mind of what the
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center would or should be like and I thought of myself as wanting to learn things so that I would be prepared to play a role as a participant in World discussion and to that end I studied many different things as you know my
55:14
undergraduate background is in physics but I also was for a while a double major in literature and I taught myself french as well as later Mandarin and now I'm trying to learn Russian and all these things are part and parcel of my
55:27
sense that it's not enough to be good at in some sense the spirit of the age favors specialization in my personal tastes favor generalization or being a polymath or as my advisor once put it I have too many hobbies so let's say a
55:44
smart young person were to come to you and ask for advice how do I self-educate myself in a broadly similar way well first should they I mean the fact of the matter is that there's a lot of cost of being broadly self-educated the fact of
55:56
the matter is but you don't regret it right 90% of the time 10% of the time I do but I mean clearly a lot of it would have to do so read a lot read very deeply if you are a Humanities person take some hard math and science classes
56:10
if you're a science person read Shakespeare read learn a foreign language really learn it spend some time and when people learn a foreign language I mean in particular I would say the one aspect of foreign language learning that's underappreciated
56:25
is accent most people are say Oh by accent's good enough and then I'm fluid but in fact for most people around the world accent is the first thing you notice about someone when they're speaking a foreign language if you have
56:39
bad grammar and have a very limited vocabulary but you can say a 100 basic phrases with 90% accurate accent most people will say you speak fairly well if you are however a fairly High degree of fluency and you have a really strong
56:53
American accent a lot of people will still still perceive you and not speaking well and without getting into without acquiring or making the effort to acquire a decent accent I'm not talking about being you know of perfectly mimicking someone who's fluent
57:07
but of getting a decent accent you won't in my view get a fully un full understanding of what that language and that culture brings to you and to close please recommend a novel for us to read well if I had to recommend the
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novel The One I like to come back to is the idiot by D the others are more famous but why the idiot well the idiot is quite interesting because of the figure of Prince Michigan and that is the idea of the the innocent surrounded by all this scheming and this you know blood and gore and evil and dovi is always worried about the problem of spirituality within the context of a real world that's changing that's Dynamic that has good and bad and evil
57:52
and how do we reconcile that and I think the idiot even more I think than crime and punishment of the brothers karamazov has a kind of at least for me a very uniquely appealing depth to it John N thank you very much thank you Tyler thanks for listening to
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