0:00
There were things that were clearly happening in the 20s that all of a sudden, you know, I'd see in the headlines today and I'd go, "Oh, okay.
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0:06
Tariffs, like that's a thing.
0:06
Circular deals, that's a thing."
0:08
There was a whole bunch of I mean, some of the stuff that's going on with meme coins.
0:11
It's a little nerve-wracking.
0:16
>> Congratulations on the book.
0:16
And thank you so much for joining.
0:19
>> Hey, thank you for having me.
0:19
I was just checking my um my score on my eight sleep. Really? I was curious.
0:24
I was because of you guys.
0:26
I'm a I'm a big fan of Matteo forever.
0:28
Um they've done an extraordinary job and but I was going to tell you I really did not do well last night at all. >> What you got? I got 43. I got 43 last night. >> I got an 84.
0:41
>> But my Aura ring I don't know if you guys ever compare my Aura ring has me in the 70s.
0:46
So I don't I don't know what to do.
0:49
But I sometimes I do you ever turn the mattress off in the middle of the night >> and then turn it back on because it's too cold.
0:55
So sometimes it gets too cold and then I need to get back to sleep.
0:57
So I'm like I got to turn it back on.
1:01
>> I think you got to do a software update.
1:03
>> You got to get on autopilot.
1:03
I have noticed that if I autopilot >> occasionally have a bunch of kids if they wind up piling into the bed over time.
1:11
I will bail go to a different bed and then the sleep gets all confused because it's like why is this four-year-old in here?
1:16
How how do we track how he sleeps? >> Crazy heartbeat. Crazy heart. I've had that.
1:20
My my daughter slept in the bed. Crazy.
1:22
like all of a sudden you're like am is there something wrong with it? >> Yeah. Yeah.
1:26
There are there are limits to technology.
1:27
Um >> well I think it's a it's it's fair to not sleep that well right before a day like today for you. >> Yes.
1:34
>> Um a day that that uh you've been working towards for how many how many we were hanging out off off the air.
1:39
You said this has been like a seven was it a sevenyear? >> Seven or eight years.
1:43
I think end of 16 early 17 is when I really sort of began uh down this road right right about 1929. So, uh, here we are.
1:53
>> So, you predicted the AI bubble all the way back then and you said I'm going to drop the book right as everyone's talking about >> talking about bubbles popping and now to be honest with you and it's actually funny that the book is coming out now.
2:05
>> I thought I was writing a story about the past and the truth is it is a story about 1929 and all the shenanigans and crazy things and I just really wanted to write a sort of cinematic uh character-driven narrative of that time.
2:17
I always loved books like Barbarians at the Gate and Den of Thieves and things like that.
2:21
And nobody had really written a book about 29 like that.
2:23
I had gone on this wild vacation years ago where I downloaded a million books about 29.
2:29
There's some really good ones, but no one told you like who the people were and what were they saying to each other.
2:34
I found some and then I found these transcripts and and uh depositions and all sorts of things and I said, "Okay, maybe I could do this."
2:39
But as I was working on it, it was weird because eerily there were things that were clearly happening in the 20s that all of a sudden I', you know, I'd see in the headlines today and I'd go, "Oh, okay.
2:52
Tariffs, like that's a thing."
2:52
U you're seeing some of these circular deals, that's a thing. Cool.
2:56
Like, uh, there was a whole bunch of I mean, some of the stuff that's going on with meme coins, >> sure, >> that's a thing. So, yeah.
3:02
Um, it gets it's a little nerve-wracking, but I I don't think we're going off the cliff just yet. I hope. >> Yeah.
3:10
Well, we know who the characters are today.
3:12
Um, but I'd love to know who were some of the key characters that stuck out to you that you identified like you want to draw extra focus towards this particular person.
3:21
I mean, Churchill sticks out, but who who else or or or maybe you could tell me the story of like how you thought to integrate Churchill into the story.
3:29
Um, and then we can talk about some of the other characters that stuck out to you.
3:34
Well, Churchill was just almost an accident.
3:36
I didn't realize Churchill happened to be in New York literally uh the week that the crash was taking place.
3:42
He had actually been down on the stock exchange and had a big dinner that was taking place, the night of the crash with every major banker and frankly every major character in this book was all going to dinner with him.
3:53
And I thought, "Okay, so now I got to figure out everything about that because I got to set that dinner up um and really understand."
4:00
He was, by the way, in the in New York because he needed money.
4:01
He was he he also loved the stock market.
4:05
He was getting loans like crazy.
4:05
He had totally got the bug.
4:07
He was investing and he also, as you might imagine, lost.
4:13
But yeah, >> really the the big characters in this book, a guy named Charlie Mitchell, who really was probably the he was almost like the Jamie Diamond of his time, maybe more like Michael Milin in certain ways, but I mean he was super famous.
4:23
He was like on the cover of magazines.
4:25
This was also a period where all of these guys also became celebrities for the first time.
4:30
And that happened in the 1920s when you know Time magazine would put these guys on the cover the same way they had put Babe Ruth and Charles Lindberg on the cover.
4:37
So sort of like what we see now, you know, whether you Sam Alman or Elon Musk or whatever that really that whole kind of celebrity CEO that started then and uh this guy Charlie Mitchell ran a bank called National City becomes Cityroup >> if you're a New Yorker.
4:54
Uh he lived by the way on Fifth Avenue between 74th and 75th uh which is where the French con the French consulate is now.
5:00
So that there's a beautiful uh building that was his house.
5:05
I mean like these guys lived like kings back then and he really invented modern credit in terms of lending it to people to go speculate or not I shouldn't say speculate but invest and ultimately a lot of people speculated with it but >> including Winston Churchill himself >> including Winston Churchill himself.
5:21
Uh, by the way, he he was staying at the Plaza Hotel, Winston Churchill.
5:25
There a brokerage house had opened an EF Hutton had opened inside the Plaza.
5:30
I mean, these these brokerage houses were opening up like like Starbucks on the corner of every street and you could go in and you put down a dollar. They'd loan you $10.
5:39
I mean, like virtually sight unseen.
5:41
And there was no prospectuses uh or anything like there's no SEC, no nothing.
5:45
So, at best you'd get like a leaflet, >> but I mean 10x leverage now that's low.
5:50
Oh, I mean I see people with 50 100x leverage.
5:55
We we learned our lesson. Go bigger.
5:58
>> So So that so so Mitchell was really sort of uh at at the edge of that and and really building that.
6:02
And the other character that really drove me to even write this book was you had Charlie Mitchell on one side and then you had a guy who you probably know, Carter Glass, uh Glass Deagle, which is a bill in in 1933 that gets put together to break up the banks.
6:17
Um, Carter Glass was a senator in Virginia who was like the Elizabeth Warren of his time.
6:23
>> He would rail about this thing called Mitchellism and how he thought Mitchell and Wall Street were going to ruin America and speculation was going to go rampant and someone had to stop these guys.
6:33
And it's really a a bit of a story the clash of these two uh remarkable figures.
6:39
And then there's so many other sort of fascinating entrepreneurs uh along the way.
6:43
a guy named Billy Durant, a guy named John Rascco.
6:45
John Rascco is Elon Musk.
6:47
I mean, I got to tell you, uh, John Rascco uh, created credit at General Motors, uh, became a a amazing investor, then takes all of his winnings, decides to get into politics, a little Elonike, uh, decides to, uh, back Al Smith against President Hoover, by the way, loses, then decides to spend his money to almost undermine Hoover's reputation.
7:10
You know, Hoover has a terrible reputation.
7:11
I actually think John Rascco had the secret campaign going that gets exposed um that really I think did a did a whole number on Hoover and then he creates what was then probably like the SpaceX of America.
7:24
He builds the Empire State Building.
7:27
So he also has 13 he has 13 children.
7:29
So you know >> there's a lot of similarities there.
7:33
There's a lot of >> Yeah.
7:34
It's so I mean yeah as you get into this is just incredible proof that uh products and and technology changes and people have just seemingly don't at all.
7:46
It's just the same kind of behaviors over and over.
7:50
>> But the truth is and this is the part that I'm always like grappling with and I know you guys spend a lot of time with these amazing startup founders and entrepreneurs.
7:58
You need some speculation in the system.
8:00
Like we always say speculation is a dirty word or a bad word, but you know the original investors in SpaceX or in Tesla who probably thought the whole thing was insane were speculating.
8:11
And you need some of that. You really do.
8:13
And so the question is like how do you create a line where you know you have enough of that to create that innovation but it doesn't go you know totally parabolic and out of control. >> Yeah.
8:26
I mean it feels like the answer is probably like you can't have some sort of systemic risk that just brings down the whole thing, right?
8:32
Uh and I want to know about the reaction to 1929.
8:34
I mean you mentioned GlassSteagall that's four years post crash. >> Yeah.
8:39
What were like the >> the tools in the tool chest? >> Yeah.
8:42
And also the key the key takeaways like hey like some of the speculation was fine maybe that's that that can drive industries forward but let's not do that again.
8:51
So I think a couple things.
8:53
First of all, leverage to me and I I wrote about this in Too Big to Fail in 2008.
8:57
Leverage is to me like the the match that lights the fire every time.
9:02
When you have too much leverage in the system, that is that is the problem.
9:04
You can actually have a lot of crazy things happening.
9:08
>> Uh but it's it's the leverage that really y >> exacerbates it and is the accelerant.
9:11
So I think you have to watch uh for that.
9:14
I think politically, interestingly, you know, we talk right now about the Federal Reserve and Fed independence and things like that.
9:22
Back then, the Fed knew that there was a problem with speculation and they didn't really do anything about it or enough about it partially because they were worried about the politics.
9:31
They were worried because they were such a new institution, they were born in 1913 that, you know, not just they'd get hauled in front of Congress, but maybe they, you know, the Fed would effectively disappear.
9:40
And then once the crash happened, instead of flooding the money, flooding the system with money the way Ben Bernanki did, who by the way learned that because of the Great Depression and studying that when he was at Princeton for his PhD, we there was almost like um no pullback.
9:57
Nobody nobody was flooding the system with money.
9:58
Everybody was in this, you know, crouched position, but you almost have to do the politically unpopular thing and flood the system with money.
10:05
Then you had a whole series of other dominoes.
10:07
You know, you had Smoot Holly, which was the tariffs. 1930 tariffs happened.
10:12
>> Global trade drops by 60% as a result of that.
10:15
Hoover is trying to raise taxes at this time.
10:18
That's the worst thing to do in a moment when the economy is faltering.
10:22
So, I think there's so many different things.
10:24
And then setting the setting up the SEC was super important because so much of what was messing up the market was in truth manipulation that wasn't really illegal at the time.
10:36
So, talk about insider trading.
10:36
There were groups of people, they call them investment pools.
10:39
And in fact, I would say it's sort of similar to what goes on with some of the meme stocks where people have like Telegram groups, >> retail armies. >> Yeah.
10:46
So these were the original retail armies.
10:49
>> These were the original retail armies, but they were typically the wealthy.
10:50
So it was the elite doing this.
10:52
This wasn't a democratized version. Okay.
10:56
>> And they had it all set up and they it would almost be like actors down on the floor of the exchange saying, you know, I'm going up for 100, you 200.
11:02
And it was sort of out of the open like some people knew that there were pools in the like for the next two weeks there might be a pool in a p in a stock and so then other people would try to jump on the train and hopefully try to jump off the train before the rug got pulled. >> Yeah.
11:17
>> But obviously didn't happen.
11:19
>> Who was on the the right side of history?
11:23
>> The right side of history.
11:24
>> Like as in as in right now right now everyone's calling it a bubble, right?
11:30
So, and and presumably that's so that they can go back and quote, you know, 2 years from now they can see like, look, I I called it, right?
11:36
And there's actually some in in 2021, there's an iconic post from Keith Ra Boy where he basically called the top to the actual day.
11:46
Um, and so there's a lot of incentive to call the top and get kind of the the the um the aura of of having that insight at the right moment or maybe just getting lucky.
11:56
But I'm curious if anybody, you know, pre 1929 was basically saying like >> two two people.
12:03
So there was a guy named Roger Babson, uh, if you know, Babson University, by the way, he founded it.
12:09
>> Um, and he created what was called the Babson break.
12:11
It happened in September of 29.
12:14
And he had been, but he had been out there.
12:16
So this was a little bit like, you know, the clock strikes midnight, you know, it is going to get there eventually.
12:20
He was out there for like a year or two or three before saying the whole thing was going to come undone. So that's one Cassandra.
12:24
Uh Charles Merrill of Meil Lynch.
12:28
He was out there in 28 saying there's a problem.
12:33
Um and then I would say the big winner was a guy named Jesse Livermore.
12:38
Jesse Livermore was a short seller who made probably like about $100 million.
12:43
He's the most interesting character.
12:43
I mean you'll if you get into this book, it's just fascinating all the things that were going on with him.
12:48
Um but he was a real trader.
12:50
By the way, he lost most of that money a couple years later. He made some of it back.
12:54
lost him back and then uh in truth ended up uh killing himself uh up on Fifth Avenue at Sherry Netherland in in the cloak room.
13:03
Literally went in there in 1940 and shot himself in the head.
13:04
So >> uh you know hard hard to say the one thing that's about >> about No, but about being a Cassandra is interesting.
13:14
So Charles Merrill was out there in in 28 saying don't invest and he was right and he was wrong.
13:20
I mean he was right in that obviously the depression took a really long time.
13:22
So he he actually probably is writer than most.
13:26
But and this is the question for most investors, the market between the beginning of 28 and September of 29 was up 90%.
13:35
>> So if you had not been in the market during that time, you would have not participated in those ups.
13:40
And so that's the question, you know, I was like I was talking to Paul Tudtor Jones about a week ago and he said I was asking him this question about bubbles.
13:48
So he said, "H I think we're in maybe like October 1999 right now." >> Yep.
13:55
>> And I said, "Oh, that's interesting." Okay. 99.
13:56
He said, "But there's still, if you said, if you remember, October 99, there was still a 40% upside." >> Yeah. Over 6 months.
14:03
>> You got to know when to get on and off the train, and that's the hard part. >> Yeah.
14:07
Uh how do you think about tariffs then versus now?
14:11
because it feels like the narrative at least is that there's the a bubble is is inflating generally, but also we're seeing high interest rates, tariffs.
14:20
There's a lot of tools in the tool chest that could kind of come down if if there was a sell-off and but it sounds like in 1929 a lot of this stuff happened after the fact like the the the government moved too late.
14:31
What was the mood around tariffs and uh and and just anything that was done beforehand that was it potential mitigator?
14:39
Like could it have possibly been worse?
14:41
Well, you'll laugh because just like the past, call it six or eight months, you know, all of his economists were writing these letters, open letters in the paper papers to Hoover saying, "Please don't do the tariffs.
14:53
We beg you not to do the tariffs."
14:55
Uh the the CEOs of the of the banks were all going to visit him in the White House.
14:59
And he had run on tariffs.
15:02
Cuz he he was trying to get farmers to vote for him in, you know, when he was campaigning in 28.
15:07
So he thought this was like a a pledge that he had made that he had to follow through on and that was a big part of what was going on.
15:13
Obviously similarly you know like a thousand economists write letters to Trump saying please don't do this.
15:19
The the distinction I think today is back then it was an acrosstheboard tariff.
15:24
Um it was there weren't these bilateral deals and so maybe you could argue today these one-off you know individual deals are better deals.
15:34
In fact, one of the ways they tried to fix what happened after Smoot Holly was in 1934, they gave the president of the United States, the authority, which is what President Trump is using today, to make these sort of bilateral deals.
15:46
So, >> um, you could you could argue maybe it's more hopeful because there's a little bit more control today than what was happening then, which was just sort of broad-based. >> Yeah.
15:56
>> So, you said uh there were retail armies, meme coins, circular deals back then.
16:00
Was there buy the dip culture? Did that exist? Anybody? Anybody in September?
16:04
Anybody in September that just like ah I'm I'm still long buying the dip. >> Yeah.
16:11
No, I don't think they I don't think they use the phrase by the dip, but there was definitely a lot of people who thought, you know, this can thing can only go up.
16:17
And this was really the first time that people ever saw the market, right?
16:20
So, they were sort of not used to the ups and downs.
16:25
>> Just up only >> up only.
16:27
And at by the end of it, I mean, you know, I don't know if you remember, you can you there's pictures in the book, but you've seen the pictures online.
16:34
>> You know, all of those pictures of people who who' be like standing outside the New York Stock Exchange during the crash, like thousands of people in the street.
16:40
The reason they had all come down there was because when they were up at the brokerages, they couldn't even find out what was happening to their stocks.
16:47
Uh cuz everything was out of out of talk about time and technology.
16:50
They didn't know what um you know the the stocks on the board would be three four hours behind. >> Sure.
16:58
>> And so that was a huge thing in terms of buying the dip.
17:00
I don't I think they were just so scared because they didn't even they didn't even know.
17:04
It would be like being at a a baseball game and you know you'd be in the eighth inning but you'd be betting on what was happening in the third inning. >> Yeah.
17:13
>> And not know what was really going on.
17:13
H >> how do you think about that uh canary in the coal mine of the of the retail trader?
17:20
There's always this apocryphal probably story from 1929 of like I knew it was time to sell when the the person who shine my shoes was giving me stock tips.
17:29
Uh how real was the are those anecdotes from what you what you found in your research and then how real is it throughout time?
17:39
>> You know I think it's not a bad signal but I think you got to take a lot of signals together.
17:42
Um John Kennedy Kennedy was the one who who tells that story uh about the shoe shine boy.
17:47
And I remember people, you know, talking in the in the do boom about, you know, getting in the back of a taxi cab and getting told, you know, buy some shares of light or whatever it is. So like that happened. I remember that.
18:00
But I don't know if that's, you know, when it be is it is it that when it becomes such a part of culture, but now with social media and by the way, all the amazing things you guys are doing, I feel like the exposure I got 15-year-old boys who are twins and they're so exposed to this stuff >> just and I don't think that they're because of their I don't think that's cuz their dad.
18:20
I think that's just like the culture.
18:22
And so I think it'd be harder to figure out today.
18:24
It's sort of look at that as the signal.
18:26
We'll tell them to >> Yeah, it feels it feels like uh it's been a very unreliable signal at least over the last two years when it feels like I've >> had people >> Yeah. Yeah. You know. Yeah.
18:37
It's been sort of >> constant.
18:38
It it certainly maybe in 2021 if the Uber driver had like a crypto wallet pulled up that was maybe a signal, but in general it's like there's so little friction to investing.
18:47
It's so much so a part of American culture now that it doesn't doesn't feel, you know, it's lost. >> I mean, I don't know.
18:54
I I feel like every Uber driver talks to me about Bitcoin now, but I was I was hearing it from people in like 15 16 Y I don't know.
19:02
>> It's been it's been kind of consistent.
19:04
Uh take me through a little bit of the the actual research process for this.
19:06
I imagine it's like one big long chat GPT probably. Just kidding.
19:13
>> Oh man, I wish chat GPT existed when I started this project and actually worked.
19:19
Um maybe my next book AI will be able to help me.
19:24
But I mean that's part of it.
19:24
I I I'm assuming a lot of the sources that you use for this book are not in the in the in the data set at all. Right.
19:34
>> They're not they're not scanned. It's it it was wild.
19:36
So what happened was I actually went to the reason I really went down the road is I go to this library at Harvard University.
19:42
Um, I happen to be there giving this speech and I'm looking through these documents and I found out that Thomas Lamont, who ran JP Morgan, his secretary was keeping transcripts basically of his conversations uh, with Hoover and Roosevelt.
19:56
And I was like, "Oh my god, this is amazing.
19:58
I got to find more of this stuff."
19:59
And the archavist said to me, "You know what, Andrew?
20:01
You're not going to be able to write the book you want to write."
20:03
She had read Too Big to Fail.
20:05
And I wanted that sort of granular detail where you're like in the room.
20:08
and she said there's not like three or four archives in the country you could just go to and just excavate. It doesn't exist.
20:14
And so I think I took that as a personal challenge really and ended up going around the country.
20:18
Um it was almost like putting puzzle pieces together, finding depositions and transcripts.
20:24
I I got access for the first time to the Federal Reserve Board minutes um from 29 in New York.
20:27
They had never been made public.
20:30
So that really created sort of like an undergurting.
20:34
got this um memoir that had never been published and a whole bunch of of other things that that really sort of helped me uh create the story and sort of a technology thing.
20:44
Mother of Invention, it wasn't just GPT, but during the pandemic, I got stuck.
20:48
All of a sudden, I couldn't get into libraries.
20:52
>> I So, uh and the only people could get in were students sometimes who had like a dissertation that they needed to do.
20:59
So I would find the library >> deployed engineers >> to find me students and I would pay them by the hour and I would say go in there find box 152 and take a picture with your phone of every single page and dropbox it to me. >> Wow.
21:14
>> And so I did I did it I it was actually a very helpful um helpful thing.
21:17
And then I will say one thing about chat GPT to its great credit it was too sad because it was too late for me.
21:23
Too late for me at the bitter end of this project I'm doing the factecking.
21:26
I had a handwritten diary of a guy who was on the board of the Fed and I only was able to read like two pages of it the whole time.
21:35
I I given it to handwriting specialists and things.
21:36
Nobody >> because you just couldn't understand.
21:39
You you could see the words but you just didn't know what they >> Yeah. terrible handwriting.
21:41
I mean chicken scratch to me.
21:44
So I'm doing the factecking and I think and I had as a PDF because I had taken pictures of the pages and so I don't know what happened to me.
21:52
I just said, "You know what? Screw it.
21:53
I'm just going to put it in chat GPT. Maybe it can read it." and it read it. Wow. >> Decipher the scrolls.
22:01
>> It wasn't perfect at all, but I was like, "Oh, yeah, that is what he's trying to say."
22:05
Oh, and that matches that and that.
22:06
So, I do wish that in some ways I had access to AI because I think that I don't know.
22:11
I don't think the story would have been totally different, but I maybe some things would have come together in a different way. >> Yeah.
22:17
Do you think part of why the crash was so bad was just the lack of highquality real-time data that the various players had to make decisions on?
22:26
It feels like >> it feels like you would have just been if you're just wildly confused about what's going on and you have people banging on your office door telling you one thing and it it just feels like it's hard to actually create a plan if you don't know how bad the damage is, how widespread it is, who the different players are.
22:42
I'm sure people were actively trying to cover up, you know, you know, bad things that they had been doing as well, right?
22:48
That that kind of thing tends to >> Totally. So, so two things.
22:50
The the guy Charlie Mitchell that I told you about before, his bank almost goes under >> because the bank bought the bank was trying to buy back its own shares during all this and it bought back too many and it couldn't afford to buy them.
23:06
>> And so, he didn't want anyone to know.
23:08
So, he actually goes and gets a loan, personal loan to buy the shares off the bank. >> Okay.
23:13
>> So, I mean, it was wild.
23:13
And then Jesse Livermore, this traitor I was telling you about, because he didn't because he was so worried about the issue of of having bad information, he paid for his own people to be on the floor so that then they would call him.
23:27
It was like Citadel placing, you know, their computers next to the exchange.
23:31
He would place his people on the floor.
23:34
>> That's you in the archive during COVID. You're the same.
23:36
You're doing the same thing.
23:38
>> Real time information. Exactly.
23:40
>> Yeah, it's the same thing.
23:41
>> Uh did did they have revenue backlogs back then? that I don't know about. I don't think so.
23:48
>> Well, can you talk a little bit more about your process?
23:50
I mean, obviously you're incredibly busy.
23:51
How do you get in the flow state to actually write a book?
23:56
Do you write one chapter at a time?
23:57
Kind of outline front to back revisions like talk about your process as an author.
24:04
>> So, I'm one of those writers, and this is not good.
24:06
I don't think I really can't write one sentence.
24:09
I So, let me say it this way.
24:12
I don't really like to write the second sentence less the first sentence I'm happy with.
24:17
>> I'm one of those people who there's some people who splatter on the page, meaning they sort of they sort of throw everything down and then they think they're going to fix it.
24:24
>> I sort of have a view that whatever gets sort of put on the page is sort of anchored in a way.
24:28
And so I can really only upgrade it uh maybe one letter grade.
24:34
So if it goes down as a B, I can edit it and make it an A.
24:36
But if I just splatter it down as a C, it's never going to be better than a B unless I start over again.
24:43
>> So that's a little bit of a a thing for me.
24:45
You know, this project went on for so long that I would write lots of little parts of it, little scenes, vignettes, and so I had these almost like puzzle pieces, and then it was about connecting them.
24:54
about connecting them. I think the hardest part for me just given the you know the things I'm doing with with the New York Times and CNBC and my dealbook stuff is for flow state I can't my wife would sometimes say oh you have half hour 45 minutes you want to go work you can go work on the book now or whatever they and unless I really had two hours I couldn't really do it cuz the first half hour 40 minutes I like almost had to rev
25:20
up yep totally >> so >> that's a thing that's a real I think in the I don't know in the creative world or It's I think you do need to get in that flow state and and that's hard and you know I've got three kids and um
25:32
sometimes I actually try to write with them like I mean like hang out with them and have them around and that's can that can work for me sometimes but I have to sort of like really get super super dialed in. What were what was the 1929
25:42
What were what was the 1929 of 1929 like what were folks in 1929 looking back to and being like this is just like >> we've seen this before history doesn't repeat but it rhymes. >> Yeah. Exactly. Exactly.
25:56
Like what were they question?
26:00
>> It's such a great question because the truth is they weren't for the most part they really because I think that this was such a first. >> Sure.
26:06
>> I I really think it was a that the 29 was such a first in terms of that break.
26:10
maybe what they would say.
26:10
So there was a break in the market in the early 20s 20 and 21 there was a break. >> Yeah.
26:16
>> Uh that was that was sub substantial but most people hadn't experienced it really because again it wasn't until 1919 that people were even started to think about taking on debt or or anything like that in the country to to then go trade.
26:29
It was really a function of General Motors by the way.
26:32
General Motors started uh loaning money to people to buy cars.
26:36
that it was a moral sin in America prior to that really to to take on credit.
26:41
Like that was a very grubby thing to do. Sure. >> Um before that.
26:45
>> Have you have you looked into tulip mania at all?
26:47
It's it's like referenced so often and then I've heard stories about Yeah.
26:51
Now it >> back then they didn't back then they were not doing the tulip thing.
26:55
>> I've heard that it's like it was actually very short. It was very isolated.
26:58
It was it was not global contagion and maybe some of it was not even as big as it might have just been somebody wrote down an extra zero in their accounting that day or for whatever reason.
27:08
Um but yeah, it's a it's a it's a fascinating story that now has just grown and grown in infamy, but maybe actually wasn't as big as something like 929 1929 that deserves a >> maybe that's the next maybe that's a slim volume. >> Maybe. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Maybe. Maybe.
27:22
>> How do you do three hours of live television a day?
27:26
>> I don't How do you do three hours?
27:26
By the way, I just want to tell you I really admire what you guys are doing.
27:29
I didn't get to say this.
27:30
We've now gotten a chance to meet each other a couple of times and it's just a joy to be on with you.
27:36
I think what you're doing is amazing and it's it's really really cool to see your success.
27:40
I was so thrilled to see that piece in the New York Times over the weekend.
27:42
Well, you're you're a hero to us and uh my favorite we've said this line on the show before, but when when we got to hang out in New York a few months back, you said uh said something to the effect of I do TV on my way to work and hearing about your process with this book, it's clear that you're an absolute workhorse. >> Yeah.
28:00
When are you guys publishing a massive extremely wellressearched book?
28:04
Uh because like it seems like this 3 hours of TV is really taken out of you guys and it is.
28:07
But I hopefully we hopefully we will learn and develop the muscle memory and the flow state and whatnot.
28:13
Uh we there's a lot to learn. This is a long game. We we've learned that. So thank you so much.
28:17
>> You guys are doing it. You guys are doing it.
28:19
>> It's an honor to have you on the show.
28:19
I cannot wait to get into the book.
28:21
We we'll have to we'll be pulling more.
28:24
>> I'm just sad that I'm not in person and there's no gong. I'm at the NASDAQ. >> Hit the gong.
28:27
Hit that gong for Andrew.
28:30
One of the most welld deserved that we've had in a while. >> Thank you so much.
28:35
Let's do this again soon and have fun on have have fun on the book tour.
28:39
I feel like you gave us the perfect the perfect amount. >> Yes.
28:43
>> Like a little teaser, a trailer.
28:43
We still need to get into it. Great to see. [Music]